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Indeterminacy, Value Pluralism, and
Tragic Cases
DAVID WOLITZ†
“We are doomed to choose, and every choice may entail an
1
irreparable loss.”

INTRODUCTION
Over the past century, the capacity of our legal system
to generate determinate and just answers to legal questions
has come under sustained skeptical attack. More precisely,
the idea that there is a single correct answer to each legal
question (the “one right answer” thesis) has been the target
of two serious assaults. The most well-known skeptical
assault, the thesis of legal indeterminacy first articulated
by American Legal Realists in the 1930s, claims that the
multiplicity of rules and interpretive techniques available to
legal decisionmakers allows them to generate multiple and
contradictory legitimate answers to specific legal questions.2
† Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law. I would
like to thank Dwight Aarons, John Anderson, Michael Cottone, and Sule Sahin
Ceylan for their thoughtful comments and encouragement on this project.
Jeremy Pam deserves special thanks for countless enlightening discussions,
informative emails, and uplifting messages. And I benefited immensely from the
practical wisdom, intellectual acuity, and faithful friendship of Jeffrey Shulman.
1. Isaiah Berlin, On the Pursuit of the Ideal, NEW YORK REV. OF BOOKS, Mar.
17, 1988, at 11, 15 [hereinafter Berlin, On the Pursuit of the Ideal].
2. BRIAN LEITER, Legal Realism and Legal Positivism Reconsidered (2001),
reprinted in NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM
AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 59, 72 (2007) [hereinafter LEITER, Legal
Realism and Legal Positivism Reconsidered] (noting the “famous Realist
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In some cases, that is, the application of authoritative legal
sources to the facts of the case yields a variety of conflicting
yet legally valid answers, rather than a single best, or most
correct, answer. In such cases, the legal decisionmaker is
inevitably left to choose on non-legal grounds among a
range of valid legal answers.3
One strategy to cope with the indeterminacy problem is
to suggest that, in cases where the law has run out and fails
to pick out the one right answer, some extra-legal (or quasilegal) normative theory might be brought to bear to
determine the single best answer among the range of legally
plausible options.4 At this point, the second skeptical
assault on the “one right answer” thesis—namely, value
pluralism or incommensurability5—announces itself by
arguments for indeterminacy which focus on the conflicting, but equally
legitimate ways, lawyers have of interpreting statutes and precedents”); Karl N.
Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 395 (1950)
[hereinafter Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision] (“One does
not progress far into legal life without learning that there is no single right and
accurate way of reading one case, or of reading a bunch of cases.”); Karl N.
Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV.
L. REV. 1222, 1239 (1931) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism]
(“[I]n any case doubtful enough to make litigation respectable the available
authoritative premises—i.e., premises legitimate and impeccable under the
traditional legal techniques—are at least two, and that the two are mutually
contradictory as applied to the case in hand.”).
3. See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 111-12 (1936);
BRIAN LEITER, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence,
in NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 15, 21, 24 [hereinafter LEITER,
Rethinking Legal Realism] (noting that the “core claim” of Legal Realism is that
“judges respond primarily to the stimulus of facts,” which is to say that “the
judge has non-legal reasons . . . for deciding the way she does”) (emphasis
omitted).
4. See, e.g, RONALD DWORKIN, The Model of Rules I, in TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY 14, 22 (1977) [hereinafter DWORKIN, The Model of Rules I] (describing
how “principles” determine hard cases that are not determinable according to
black-letter rules).
5. Although there are species of value pluralism that reject the
incommensurability of values, this Article will use the terms interchangeably.
For more detail on the debate among value pluralists over incommensurability,
see INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON (Ruth
Chang ed., 1997).
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denying the possibility that normative theory can offer
determinate resolutions to many of the most vexing
normative dilemmas. According to the incommensurability
thesis, the ultimate values recognized by our community
and by our law are irreducibly plural; there is no single
value that the legal system aims, or should aim, to satisfy or
maximize, nor can the variety of ultimate values be
compared to one another along a single scale or metric.6
Thus, when a legal dispute implicates two ultimate and
incommensurable values, there is no logical method to
determine which value to prefer over the other.7 The
ultimate values at stake may justify two or more conflicting
resolutions to the conflict. When the decisionmaker faces
such a choice, a choice between or among incommensurable
values, the values themselves cannot resolve the choice. Nor
can the decisionmaker weigh the values against one another
on a scale or metric amenable to both values; no such
common scale or metric exists.8 In the end, the
decisionmaker must choose between two incommensurable
goods, knowing that neither choice is the uniquely right
answer to the dilemma.
The debates over legal indeterminacy and value
pluralism have been the subject of sustained and
sophisticated analysis for decades already, and a
painstaking review of these debates is beyond the scope of
this article.9 Nevertheless, I will defend versions of both
legal indeterminacy and value incommensurability that
have achieved broad (though by no means unanimous)
agreement and identify a class of cases—which I call tragic
cases—that are both legally indeterminate and shot through
with significant value incommensurability. The versions of
legal indeterminacy and value pluralism that I defend share
6. See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 55-59 (1993).
7. Id. at 58.
8. Id. at 55.
9. For a fair review of the indeterminacy debate, see Lawrence B. Solum,
Indeterminacy, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 488
(Dennis Patterson ed., 1999) [hereinafter Solum, Indeterminacy]. For a
comprehensive introduction to debates over value pluralism, see
INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 5.
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an important structural similarity: the claim of both theses
is that the available authoritative premises (legal and
moral) are themselves plural and irreconcilable and
therefore can generate multiple and contradictory
resolutions to particular legal disputes. The claim is not the
nihilistic view that authoritative and objective sources do
not exist; nor is it the relativist claim that there are no
objectively better or worse answers to legal or normative
questions. Rather, the claim is that there are too many
authoritative and objective sources, whether legal or moral,
to definitively yield a uniquely correct answer in certain
cases.10 Both legal indeterminacy and value pluralism, then,
are quintessentially internal critiques;11 they take sources of
law and ultimate values as objective12 and capable of
constraining choice, but they also demonstrate that even an
earnest commitment to align one’s decisions and actions to
the demands of law or morality can leave a decisionmaker
without conclusive grounds for choosing one course of action
over another when there are a range of legally and morally
supportable conclusions.
Recognizing that there are some cases that are both
legally and ethically indeterminate has several implications
for legal theory generally and for theories of adjudication in
particular. Broadly speaking, the existence of indeterminacy
10. Even in tragic cases, however, there may be demonstrably wrong
answers, answers that the authoritative legal sources and values do not permit.
11. John William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal
Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 10 (1984) (“[Indeterminacy] is an internal critique. This
is a critique from within, a critique that uses the premises of traditional legal
theory against itself.”).
12. Following Isaiah Berlin, the claim of moral objectivity made here is the
thesis that there is a range, but not an infinity, of ultimate ends sought by
human beings and human societies. See ISAIAH BERLIN, My Intellectual Path, in
THE POWER OF IDEAS 1, 12 (Henry Hardy ed., 2000) [hereinafter BERLIN, My
Intellectual Path] (“There is not an infinity of them: the number of human
values . . . is finite – let us say 74, or perhaps 122, or 26, but finite, whatever it
may be.”). It is not an ontological claim that values constitute facts like facts of
the physical world. Berlin is not taking a position on the debate over “moral
realism” or “moral cognitivism” as those terms are used in moral philosophy.
See, e.g., Mark van Roojen, Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism, THE
STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF
PHILOSOPHY
(Dec.
4,
2013),
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-cognitivism.
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and incommensurability should chasten our ambitions for
what normative jurisprudence can provide for our legal
system; it cannot provide a determinate procedure for
generating uniquely correct answers to all legal cases.
Theories that promise such global determinacy are bound to
disappoint us, for the indeterminacy and value pluralism
endemic in our law is deeply ingrained.13 In this sense, the
polemicists of the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement
were correct.14 Theories that claim that law by itself—or
that the sources of law coupled with suitable normative and
interpretive theories—can generate decisive reasons for
choosing the one best answer in every case are not
plausible; they are false hopes, at best, or conscious
delusions masking ulterior motives at worst.15
What legal theory can do after the law has run out is
help us identify genuinely tragic cases from run-of-the-mill
cases or pseudo-tragic cases (the epistemological project)
and help us illuminate the legal-systemic and moral stakes
at play in genuinely tragic cases (the normative project).
The existence of tragic cases—of real indeterminacy and
real value pluralism—does not mean that every legal
dispute is a tragic case; not even every hard case is a tragic
case. Recognition of tragic cases does not imply that legal
decisionmakers are absolved from the conventional task of
earnestly attempting to find the one right answer to
disputes they are responsible for resolving.16 Though the
13. My claim is not that the very concept of law implies indeterminacy or
value pluralism, but only that a legal system as complex and internally diverse
as ours will as a matter of fact generate legally indeterminate cases.
14. Duncan Kennedy, The Critique of Rights in Critical Legal Studies, in
LEFT LEGALISM / LEFT CRITIQUE 178, 191 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds.,
2002) [hereinafter Kennedy, The Critique of Rights in Critical Legal Studies]
(“[W]hatever it is that decides the outcome [of a case], it is not the correct
application of legal reasoning under a duty of interpretive fidelity to the
materials.”).
15. See id.
16. Cf. Frederick Schauer, Instrumental Commensurability, 146 U. PA. L.
REV. 1215, 1230 (1998) [hereinafter Schauer, Instrumental Commensurability]
(questioning whether legal decisionmakers who believe in value
incommensurability might follow a “less thoughtful approach to hard decisions
than ought to be the case” because they see more incommensurable choices than
actually exist).

534

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

existence of tragic cases implies the real possibility that
such attempts may fail, a genuine attempt and genuine
failure to resolve the case at hand pursuant to conventional
legal and normative reasoning is a precondition to
identifying tragic cases.17 Decisionmakers should thus be
aware of the possibility of tragic cases, but, just as in
everyday life, awareness of the possibility of tragedy need
not and should not undermine or downgrade sound
decisionmaking processes; rather, it should refine them.
Still, the question remains: when a legal decisionmaker
does face a genuinely tragic case, how is she to choose
among the range of plausible but contradictory resolutions
to the case? Of course, no determinate answer is possible to
this question. The decisionmaker must choose among
multiple options, all of which are rational from conflicting
and valid premises. Deductive logic cannot resolve the case,
nor can maximization of a single value or balancing between
values. Nevertheless, I will argue that tragic cases, though
they lack a single decisive answer, are amenable to
reflection and deliberation in the venerable tradition of
practical wisdom.18 Such deliberation must rely on
experience and cultivation of the virtues of sensitivity and
humility. It may include reflection on which choice coheres
best with our particular collective sense of self (our ethos)
and with the particular story we want to tell about
ourselves. It may also include imagining the different
futures likely to result from the choices available and
speculating about our relative capacities to endure the
different losses of value that would result from each
decision. Such deliberation cannot, of course, produce
17. I will not here challenge the conventional view that if the law or some
extra-legal norm does provide decisive reasons to choose one right answer, those
reasons are ipso facto authoritative and should determine the outcome of the
case. There is, of course, a profound question in normative jurisprudence about
what legal decisionmakers should do when authoritative legal sources
determine resolutions to disputes that clash with the judge’s own deeply held
normative principles, but that debate is beyond the scope of this project. For a
sensitive exploration of that issue in the context of antebellum fugitive slave
laws, see generally ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975).
18. See discussion infra Part IV.
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irrefutable reasons to choose among valid and conflicting
options. But processes of reflection and deliberation can
help flesh out the specific legal-systemic and normative
stakes involved in the particular case at hand and sensitize
the decisionmaker to the (incommensurable) advantages
and disadvantages of different decisions. At minimum, such
processes can minimize the risk of deciding the case without
adequately acknowledging a particular value or
consequence at stake.
Borrowing from Isaiah Berlin’s account of value
pluralism, I contend that in tragic cases the decisionmaker
must ultimately make a “radical choice”19 among
incommensurable options and that this choice is tragic—
tragic because some ultimate value must be sacrificed to
honor another ultimate value, and no decisive reason can be
given to determine which value shall be sacrificed and
which honored.20 The loss suffered in tragic cases is thus not
redeemable by reference to a greater good.
Recognizing the necessity of radical choices in tragic
cases might plausibly lead to two very different dispositions:
on the one hand, decisionmakers might experience radical
choice as liberating, as a rare chance to exercise personal
preference, creativity, or imagination. Like a young student
told that there is no wrong answer, the liberated judge
might feel free to go with her gut and move on. On the other
hand, decisionmakers might experience radical choice as
paralyzing or depressing. Without a rational basis to choose
one plausible option over another, the paralyzed or
depressed judge may not be able to close the case; he dwells
on the inevitable and irredeemable loss of value his decision
will bring about, and he continues fretting over the case
even after formally issuing an opinion. He cannot move on.
In the face of tragic cases, neither disposition is more
rational than the other, but I endeavor to describe why a
19. See JOHN GRAY, ISAIAH BERLIN 23 (1996) (“Such choice is, for Berlin,
choice among goods that are not only distinct and rivalrous but sometimes
incommensurable: it is radical choice, ungoverned by reason.”).
20. See BERLIN, My Intellectual Path, supra note 12, at 23 (noting that not all
ultimate values can be obtained, “choices must be made, sometimes tragic losses
accepted”).
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tragic sensibility—so long as it falls short of outright
paralysis—is most consonant with the nature of radical
choice and more likely to engender the kind of sensitivity
and humility most appropriate to cases involving
irredeemable loss.
In Part I, I review and defend the moderate version of
legal indeterminacy articulated by Karl Llewellyn and other
Legal Realists while rejecting the radical version of legal
indeterminacy articulated by some CLS scholars. Part II
then describes the main contours of value pluralism,
primarily as expounded by Isaiah Berlin in a series of
essays beginning with his famous lecture Two Concepts of
Liberty. In Part III, I explain why moderate legal
indeterminacy and the thesis of value pluralism together
have profound implications for normative jurisprudence in
general and theories of adjudication in particular. Finally,
in Part IV, I explore how legal decisionmakers ought to
approach tragic cases and to what extent cultivation of the
traditional virtue of practical wisdom (or prudence) can
provide useful guidance to decisionmakers facing such
cases.
I. INDETERMINACY
The debate over legal determinacy dominated law
school-based jurisprudence in the United States in the
1980s and 1990s and continues to be a serious source of
debate.21 Though the CLS movement embraced a diverse
array of projects and claims, the indeterminacy thesis
became the most salient element of its critique of
conventional legal practices, and it in turn became a
lightning rod for mainstream liberal and conservative
criticism of CLS.22 The upshot was a surge of interest in the
questions of whether legal adjudication can or does (or
21. Steven L. Winter, Bull Durham and the Uses of Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV.
639, 679 (1990) (describing the legal academy’s “continuing pre-occupation with
the indeterminacy debate”).
22. For a sophisticated discussion of the place of the indeterminacy thesis in
the Critical Legal Studies movement and the reaction to it, see ROBIN WEST,
NORMATIVE JURISPRUDENCE 157-66 (2011).
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cannot and does not) provide rationally determinate
resolutions to specific legal disputes. The far poles of the
debate are relatively easy to describe. On the one end, the
thesis of global indeterminacy23 holds that law cannot ever
provide rationally determinate resolutions to specific legal
disputes.24 On the other end, the thesis of global
determinacy holds that law always can provide rationally
determinate resolutions to specific legal disputes.25 Neither
pole in the debate is plausible for reasons I articulate below,
and, given the passion and rhetorical high pitch of the
debate, what is perhaps more striking is how few theorists
actually reside or ever resided on either pole. The real
action in the indeterminacy debate has always been
between the poles—arguments about the sources,
frequency, and implications of indeterminacy (and
determinacy).26
Fundamentally, proponents of indeterminacy have
located its source in three basic areas: (1) the general
vagueness or plasticity of language;27 (2) conflicting norms
and doctrines within authoritative sources of law;28 and (3)
23. The indeterminacy thesis I discuss in this section is what Brian Leiter
calls rational indeterminacy, or indeterminacy as to reason, as opposed to causal
indeterminacy. BRIAN LEITER, A Note on Legal Indeterminacy, in NATURALIZING
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 2, 9, 9-10 [hereinafter LEITER, A Note on Legal
Indeterminacy]; see also Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Determinacy,
Objectivity, and Authority, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 560-61 (1993).
24. See, e.g., Winter, supra note 21.
25. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 143 (1985) [hereinafter
DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE] (describing the existence of indeterminate
cases as “so rare as to be exotic”); Ronald Dworkin, No Right Answer?, in LAW,
MORALITY, AND SOCIETY 58, 84 (P. Hacker & J. Raz eds., 1977) [hereinafter
Dworkin, No Right Answer?] ("For all practical purposes, there will always be a
right answer in the seamless web of our law.”); see also LEITER, A Note on Legal
Indeterminacy, supra note 23, at 11 (arguing that Ronald Dworkin “can be
understood” to embrace global determinacy). Nobody to my knowledge tries to
defend the position that actually existing legal decisionmakers and institutions
in fact always articulate, or arrive at, the correct rationally determinate
resolutions to legal disputes.
26. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE
ROLE OF POLITICS IN JUDGING 186-87 (2010).
27. I will refer to this as the Linguistic Argument.
28. I will refer to this as the Internal Contradictions Argument.
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conflicting interpretative and legal reasoning techniques
available to legal decisionmakers.29 There are radical and
moderate versions of each argument. In their radical or
global versions, arguments for indeterminacy claim that
indeterminacy is pervasive throughout the law and fatal to
all (or almost all) attempts to reach a single correct answer
to legal questions. In more moderate versions, arguments
for indeterminacy claim that indeterminacy arises only
episodically in the law and that some legal questions do
have single correct answers while others do not.
A. The Linguistic Argument
The linguistic argument for radical indeterminacy holds
that, because legal sources are composed in language and
because language is inherently contingent, artificial, and
manipulable, there can be no sense in which one
interpretation or application of the language of legal sources
is better than any other.30 Rather, the language of any legal
source can map onto the world (or the facts of a case) in an
infinite variety of ways, none more or less correct than any
other.31 There are no facts in the world that determine—
make it necessary—that any instance of language means
one thing rather than another; therefore, there are no facts
in the world that determine—make it necessary—that any
instance of legal language (such as a rule) means one thing
29. I will refer to this as the Interpretive Argument. Legal Realists and
others also articulated a fourth source of indeterminacy, namely how facts in
the world (even when undisputed) can be legitimately described in different
ways, resulting in different legal classifications and implications. See, e.g.,
FRANK, supra note 3, at 102-05.
30. See Coleman & Leiter, supra note 23, at 568 (“The core of semantic
skepticism is the claim that there are no facts that constitute or determine a
sentence’s meaning, so that language is indeterminate at the most basic level:
there are no objective facts that make it the case that language means one thing
rather than another.”).
31. To put this in structuralist terms, there is no necessary connection
between signifiers and signifieds—between words, phrases, utterances, and
other signs on the one hand, and the things those words purport to represent.
See generally FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS 65-67
(Perry Meisel & Haun Saussy eds., Wade Baskin trans., Columbia Univ. Press
2011).
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rather than another. Global legal indeterminacy, on this
account, is just a function of global semantic indeterminacy,
an indeterminacy besetting all communication by
language.32
The problem with this version of indeterminacy, then, is
that the claim that there are no objective facts in the world
which determine the meaning of words does not mean that
words can never have determinate meaning, only that what
makes the meaning of words determinate are not facts in
the world. Rather, the meaning of words can be determined
by the conventions of a linguistic community—its practices,
behaviors, dispositions, and understandings.33 One can
concede, in other words, that the meaning of linguistic
expression is a question of convention, not of physical fact,
without
conceding
that
meaning
is
necessarily
indeterminate. The conventions of a linguistic community
may be sufficiently clear that the meaning of certain
expressions can be contextually fixed, or determined, for
that linguistic community at that time. Of course, the
conceptual possibility of determinate meaning affixed to
linguistic expression does not tell us whether or how much
the meaning of expressions actually are determined, but it
does defeat the claim that such determinacy is impossible.34
And if one admits that language is capable of generating
determinate meanings, then one can no longer argue that
law is globally indeterminate because it is expressed in
language.
A more moderate and plausible version of linguistic
indeterminacy is the one promoted by H.L.A. Hart in his
classic book The Concept of Law.35 There, Hart argues that
32. Coleman & Leiter, supra note 23, at 571 (“If language itself is
indeterminate, then legal language is indeterminate a fortiori.”).
33. Id. (“Meaning is not radically indeterminate; instead meaning is public—
fixed by public behavior, beliefs, and understandings. There is no reason to
assume that such conventions cannot fix the meanings of terms
determinately.”).
34. See Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 531 (1988)
[hereinafter Schauer, Formalism] (“We have seen that, as a descriptive and
conceptual matter, rules can generate determinate outcomes . . . .”).
35. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (3d ed. 2012) (1961).
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words are inherently “open-textured”—they have both a
core meaning and a penumbra.36 The core meaning of words
consists of the clear, uncontroversial, and paradigmatic
meanings of those words pursuant to the linguistic
convention of the relevant linguistic community.37 But
words also have penumbral edges to their meanings—areas
of disputed meaning within which reasonable arguments
may be made both in favor and against including that area
within the word’s meaning. Hart argued that when legal
norms use words, determinate application to specific cases
is possible where the facts of the case fall within the core
meanings of the relevant words (or clearly outside the
meaning of the relevant words), but indeterminacy arises
when the facts of the case fall within the penumbral
meanings of the relevant words.38 According to this picture,
many, perhaps most, legal cases have determinate answers,
but some remaining, perhaps peripheral, class of legal cases
exists for which no determinate answers exist because of
the open texture of language itself. Over time, of course,
words used in legal norms may attain clearer and clearer
meanings—i.e., their penumbral areas will recede through
conventional evolutions and authoritative decisionmaking—
and the amount of legal indeterminacy traceable to a word’s
penumbral meaning may decline. But the world continually
throws up novel factual scenarios that lie in the penumbra
of a word’s meaning, so debates about a word’s meaning are
never completely closed, and a once-and-for-all total defeat
of legal indeterminacy is thus not possible.39
B. The Internal Contradictions Argument
The second major strand of radical indeterminacy
claims that legal indeterminacy derives from pervasive
36. See id. at 128.
37. Id. at 123. For instance, a motorized car being driven would constitute a
“vehicle” in our linguistic community because that is the core meaning of vehicle
today in our linguistic community. See id. at 128, 130.
38. Id. at 273 (describing “hard cases” as those “where the existing law fails
to dictate any decision as the correct one”).
39. Id.

2014]

INDETERMINACY

541

contradictions in legal sources. The gist of the claim is that
every domain of American law, of whatever substantive
category and at every level of generality, is shot through
with normative contradictions making it impossible to
generate a single correct description of the law or a single
correct application of the law to a concrete legal dispute.40
Most famously, Duncan Kennedy once argued that all of
American law, perhaps all liberal law, suffers from a
fundamental contradiction between our need for others and
our need to be free from others.41 But the “internal
contradictions” argument for pervasive indeterminacy does
not always go as far as positing a single fundamental
contradiction at play in all instances of law. It usually
claims that normative contradictions (plural) are pervasive
throughout the law, making it impossible to determine a
single correct way to interpret or apply the law.42 Indeed,
much of CLS scholarship consisted of demonstrating the
normative contradictions endemic to field after field of
American law.43 The general claim is that the law governing
any domain includes conflicting values which, in turn,
40. ANDREW ALTMAN, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: A LIBERAL CRITIQUE 117-20
(1990) (describing the “patchwork thesis” of CLS).
41. Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries, 28 BUFF.
L. REV. 205, 213 (1979) [hereinafter Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone’s
Commentaries]; see also Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1766 (1976) [hereinafter Kennedy, Form
and Substance] (“Every occasion for lawmaking will raise the fundamental
conflict of individualism and altruism, on both a substantive and a formal
level.”). In 1984, Kennedy announced that he no longer put any stock in the
fundamental contradiction thesis. See Peter Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Roll
Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1, 15-16 (1984) (“First of all, I renounce the
fundamental contradiction. I recant it, and I also recant the whole idea of
individualism and altruism, and the idea of legal consciousness, . . . I really see
the fundamental contradiction these days as a lifeless slogan . . . .”).
42. See, e.g., Richard S. Markovits, Legitimate Legal Argument and
Internally-Right Answers to Legal-Rights Questions, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 415,
442 (1999) (“Some members of the Critical Legal Studies movement also try to
justify their conclusion that there are no internally-right answers to legal-rights
questions by arguing that the usefulness of liberal legalism . . . is destroyed by
its internal contradictions (antinomies).”).
43. See Robert W. Gordon, Unfreezing Legal Reality: Critical Approaches to
Law, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 195, 198 (1987).
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reflect conflicting interests at work in the larger society.44
Rather than solve conflicts determinately, the law on this
account reflects and contains the very underlying conflicts
which give rise to legal disputes in the first place. The legal
decisionmaker thus has available within the law multiple
and conflicting norms (pitched at the level of principle,
policy, standard, or rule) which allow him or her to decide
any given case for the plaintiff or for the defendant. Robert
Gordon, for instance, argued that contract law contains
within it both a set of formal arms-length transaction norms
and a conflicting set of informal mutual reliance norms.45
The upshot is that “the doctrines of contract law in fact
make available to parties in all cases—including cases that
appear . . . to require a single clearly correct outcome—a
multiplicity of regulatory regimes, some rooted in
individualist, and others in cooperative, solidary, visions of
economic life.”46
The more moderate version of the internal
contradictions thesis was offered by many of the Legal
Realist thinkers of the 1930s.47 The Realists were not, of
course, the first to discover that in some areas of law the
authoritative sources of law—precedents, statutes, etc.—
sometimes contain conflicting prescriptions. Nor were they
the first to recognize that some cases leave the judge
discretion because of a gap or silence in the existing law.48
Indeed, even the archetypal formalists of the late
44. See id.
45. Id. at 215.
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., id. at 197.
48. In terms of their determinacy, there is really no difference between a case
in which two relevant authorities conflict (conflicting precedents) and a case in
which no authority dictates a particular result (a gap). In both cases, the extant
authorities allow for multiple and contradictory rulings. In both cases, that is,
the law is underdeterminate. See Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy
Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462, 473 (1987)
[hereinafter Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis]. The law may rationally rule
out some dispositions of the case, but does not prescribe a single correct
resolution. See id. (“The law is underdeterminate with respect to a given case if
and only if the set of results in the case that can be squared with the legal
materials is a nonidentical subset of the set of all imaginable results.”).
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nineteenth century recognized that some precedent cases
could not be reconciled with other equally authoritative
decisions and that some cases involved issues of first
impression.49 In the case of conflicting precedents, the
formalist solution to this phenomenon was to simply
dismiss one of the conflicting precedents as itself erroneous
or an outlier and then to craft from the remaining “correct”
cases a unitary doctrine capable (they believed) of yielding
uniquely correct results.50 Formalists could perform this
move because they believed that the common law was in
some sense discovered by judges, not made, and that
doctrine therefore was something other than the mere
record of legal decisions. The legal decisions were evidence
of the doctrine, not its creators.
Realists, however, abandoned the idea that the common
law was anything other than the record of decided cases and
the conventions related to them, so they could not dismiss
conflicting precedents by declaring one precedent correct
and another a deviation from the true common law.51 The
Realists insisted that conflicting precedents were nothing
more than different decisions by different judges reflecting
different choices about what the law is or should be.52 A
judge’s choice among available authorities, many Realists
argued, was due to some underlying normative view or
49. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION 174 (1993) [hereinafter KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER]
(explaining how the Langdellian System could recognize and accommodate cases
of first impression).
50. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 18701960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 14-15 (1992) (noting that the
“identification of anomalies was a central part of the task of legal integration
after 1870”). For cases of alleged gaps in the law, formalists were confident that
existing doctrine could be abstracted, analogized, or deduced as necessary to
determinately solve the novel case. See KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER, supra note
49, at 174. Of course, a formalist need not believe that every jurist will agree on
the right disposition of a novel case, only that there exists a single correct
answer. Id.
51. Marin Roger Scordato, Post-Realist Blues: Formalism, Instrumentalism,
and the Hybrid Nature of Common Law Jurisprudence, 7 NEV. L.J. 263, 271-77
(2007) (describing shift from formalist to realist view of common law).
52. Id.
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disposition of the judge, whether conscious or not. For
Realists, the existence of conflicting authorities implied that
judges inevitably have discretion to choose among
authorities and thus to craft multiple, contradictory
resolutions of the case.
The Realist version of the “internal contradiction”
argument is thus distinct from the radical argument of
some CLS authors in two crucial respects—first, in its
account of where contradictions are found and second, in its
account of the pervasiveness of such contradictions. While
Realist authors focused on conflicts at the level of legal
doctrine, CLS authors claimed that the important
contradictions are manifest at even deeper levels of norms
and interests. For CLS thinkers, the doctrinal
contradictions of law are not superficial blemishes on an
otherwise coherent jurisprudence; the contradictions go all
the way down to the normative foundations of the doctrine
and the competing social interests behind them.
Consequently, according to the CLS view, these deeplyrooted contradictions are pervasive throughout the law and
will defeat any attempt to render the law as coherent or
univocal. For Realists, because the contradictions that
mattered were those at the level of doctrine, projects to
rationalize and harmonize doctrine were seen as worthwhile
and capable of significant success, though Realists
understood that the increasing complexity of law in a
regulatory state would continually yield new doctrinal
conflicts.53 In short, the radical version sees contradiction as
ineradicable, global, and baked into the law’s very
foundations, while the moderate version views doctrinal
contradictions as a real and enduring phenomenon of a
sprawling legal system, but not necessarily a global feature
of all law. For the moderate version, one need only accept
the proposition that generations of lawyers have accepted as

53. See TAMANAHA, supra note 26, at 94 (“The various goals of the realists
were to increase the certainty and predictability of law, to train better lawyers,
to advance legal justice, and to reform the law to better serve social needs.”).
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a truism—that authoritative legal doctrine sometimes
contains conflicts.54
C. The Interpretive Argument
Finally, the Realists bolstered their moderate argument
for indeterminacy with a novel critique of the interpretive
techniques available to legal decisionmakers. This
argument, most associated with Karl Llewellyn, begins from
the premise that the content of legal rules55 articulated in
legal authorities, such as cases and statutes, are not always
self-evident, but instead must be interpreted or construed
by judges faced with applying legal authorities to specific
cases.56 According to Llewellyn, however, there are a variety
of orthodox modes of interpreting precedent cases and
statutes, and these modes of interpretation often work at
cross-purposes.57 With respect to cases, Llewellyn argued
that judges often have great latitude to interpret the rules
of precedent cases narrowly or broadly, such that the rule in
the precedent case either demands one outcome or

54. This moderate version of the internal contradictions argument for
indeterminacy does not, of course, answer the question of the extent of
indeterminacy. In principle, the extent of indeterminacy is a simple function of
the frequency with which cases are subject to conflicting legal authorities, and it
is an empirical question how many legal disputes in fact call forth genuinely
conflicting legal authorities. The Realists who first made this argument
emphasized how often legal cases, especially cases at the appellate level, do in
fact implicate conflicting precedents. Since the 1930s, very few academics or
judges have disputed the Realist argument that conflicting legal authority, and
thus indeterminacy, exists in some subset of cases. See Frederick Schauer, Easy
Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 410-11 (1985) [hereinafter Schauer, Easy Cases].
But there is a rough split of opinion between those who think such
indeterminacy exists in most, or a relatively large percentage, of legal disputes
and those who think such indeterminacy is confined to a relatively small
number of cases. LEITER, Legal Realism and Legal Positivism Reconsidered,
supra note 2, at 78 (noting real disagreement between H.L.A. Hart and Legal
Realists over “range of cases” in which indeterminacy adheres).
55. In this section, I am using the term rules to refer to rules, standards, and
other prescriptive formulations of law.
56. See generally Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision,
supra note 2, at 395.
57. Id.
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another.58 With respect to legislation, Llewellyn famously
claimed that each canon of statutory interpretation is
opposed by a corresponding counter-canon such that the
judge can legitimately apply “opposing canons” in
interpreting a statute “on almost every point.”59 In sum, “in
any case doubtful enough to make litigation respectable the
available authoritative premises . . . are at least two, and
that the two are mutually contradictory as applied to the
case in hand.”60
Today, of course, Llewellyn’s arguments about the
malleability of precedent and the multiplicity of opposing
canons of construction are commonplace even in first-year
law school classrooms. But the key for Llewellyn is that
each of the opposing interpretive techniques is equally
legitimate, and thus each of the potential resolutions of a
case generated by these techniques is an equally legitimate
legal outcome.61 Note, also, that this argument for
indeterminacy does not depend on explicit contradictions
within the authoritative legal sources themselves; there
need be no clashing precedents or contradictory legislation.62
Even if there is only a single legal authority applicable to a
case, the multiplicity of legitimate interpretive techniques
allows the legal decisionmaker to generate multiple
constructions of the applicable rule and thus generate
multiple resolutions to the case.
58. Id. at 395-96.
59. Id. at 401.
60. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism, supra note 2, at 1239.
61. This moderate Interpretive Argument has obvious parallels to the
linguistic argument discussed above, as both point to the multiplicity of
interpretations available with respect to a single piece of language. But the
Interpretive Argument is not an argument about the nature of language as
such; it is an argument about the conventions of legal interpretation in
particular. It does not make any claims about legitimate interpretation of
language in general; the claim is, rather, that there are specific and identifiable
orthodox modes of interpreting legal authorities and that these modes can and
do lead to opposing resolutions to legal disputes.
62. Of course, caselaw and legislation are not the only sources of law in our
system. But Llewellyn’s discussion of interpretive techniques with respect to
cases and statutes can easily be extended to other sources of law, e.g., to the
variety of Constitutional, regulatory, or treaty interpretation techniques.
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Llewellyn’s argument about interpretive techniques was
seized upon by some CLS authors in the 1980s and
expanded into another radical critique of legal reasoning.63
Llewellyn’s cagey claim was that indeterminacy existed “in
any case doubtful enough to make litigation respectable.”64
The implication was that there exist many cases for which
the relevant legal authorities and legitimate methods of
legal interpretation do provide a single correct answer,
namely those cases for which litigation is not respectable.65
But for some CLS authors, there was no universe of cases or
legal disputes for which existing legal premises could
determine a single correct outcome; the malleability of
interpretation, on this radical account, renders all legal
disputes indeterminate.66 Any authority can be made to
yield any holding because there is no rational limit to the
spin lawyers and judges can put on pre-existing rules. As
Mark Tushnet once put it, “the acceptable techniques of
legal reasoning—distinguishing on the basis of the facts,
analogizing to other areas of law where cognate problems
arise, and the like—are so flexible that they allow us to
assemble diverse precedents into whatever pattern we
choose.”67
Once again, then, there is a split between a moderate
version and a radical version of indeterminacy. For
Llewellyn and other moderates, some legal rules relevant to
some legal cases are vulnerable to equally legitimate and
conflicting interpretations due to the multiplicity of
legitimate interpretive techniques. But for moderates, how
63. See Gordon, supra note 43, at 197 (describing CLS rediscovery of and
radicalization of Legal Realist approaches to law).
64. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism, supra note 2, at 1239.
65. See, e.g., Schauer, Easy Cases, supra note 54, at 410-11.
66. See generally MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
(1988).

OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

67. See id. Duncan Kennedy has argued that there simply is no such thing as
a distinctive mode of legal reasoning. “Teachers teach nonsense,” he wrote,
“when they persuade students that legal reasoning is distinct as a method for
reaching correct results from ethical or political discourse in general.” Duncan
Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy, 32 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 591, 598 (1982) [hereinafter Kennedy, Legal Education].
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many cases actually are indeterminate due to the existence
of conflicting modes of interpretation is, in principle, an
empirical question. One has to actually reason through the
universe of cases to see which ones are amenable to
multiple conflicting answers and which ones are amenable
to only a single correct legal answer. For radicals, on the
other hand, all legal rules are vulnerable to multiple and
conflicting interpretations in every case, and thus every
case can generate multiple and conflicting resolutions.
D. Arriving at Moderate Indeterminacy
The above tour of the indeterminacy debate does not
purport to exhaust the topic, but rather to describe the
strongest sets of arguments in favor of legal indeterminacy
and to delineate moderate indeterminacy from radical
indeterminacy. Based on my descriptions, it should come as
no surprise that I think the moderate versions of all three
major arguments for indeterminacy are persuasive, while
the radical versions of those arguments are not. More
tellingly, when one reviews the state of the debate on
indeterminacy, there is a striking congruence of views
around the moderate versions of indeterminacy. Both those
who pose as defenders of determinacy and those who pose
as proponents of indeterminacy converge on moderate
indeterminacy.68 Where they differ, of course, is in their
assessment of how marginal or how pervasive the
phenomenon of indeterminacy actually is in the American
legal system.
From CLS authors, like Duncan Kennedy, one now
hears that “[j]udges are, to a significant extent, practically
‘bound’ by law and often, often, often declare and apply
rules that they would never vote for if they were
legislators.”69 John William Singer, in one of the most cited
CLS articles, wrote that “[i]t is easy to create completely
68. Brian Tamanaha makes a similar point about the broad consensus of
views among judges and jurists with respect to realism and formalism.
TAMANAHA, supra note 26, at 186-87.
69. DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE
(1997).
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determinate legal rules and arguments.”70 Of course,
Kennedy and Singer continue to argue that the scope of
indeterminacy in our legal system is, in fact, quite pervasive
for the reasons detailed above.71 But they do not appear to
be arguing that indeterminacy is a global or necessary
feature of legal systems in general or of the American legal
system in particular.
On the other side, those who have most vociferously
criticized global indeterminacy—Owen Fiss, Frederick
Schauer, Andrew Altman, Brian Leiter, Ken Kress, Larry
Solum, and others—all admit that the law is sometimes
indeterminate. Owen Fiss, for example, argues that judges
are “constrained in their judgment” by the “disciplining
rules” of the institutionally rooted practice of judging.72 But
he freely admits that the law and associated disciplining
rules “constrain, not determine, judgment.”73 Frederick
Schauer has done more than anyone to intellectually revive
the reputation of (a certain kind of) formalism and to argue
against the thesis of global legal indeterminacy.74 Yet he too
unashamedly agrees with H.L.A. Hart’s view that, because
of the open texture of words and concepts, legal norms have
both uncontroversial core application and indeterminate
fringe applications.75 Thus, he is comfortable with the idea
that “cases at the margin” exist for which more than one
resolution is legitimate.76 Andrew Altman wrote a book70. Singer, supra note 11, at 11.
71. See, e.g., id. at 14 (“Legal doctrine is far more indeterminate than
traditional theorists realize it is. If traditional legal theorists are correct about
the importance of determinacy to the rule of law, then—by their own criteria—
the rule of law has never existed anywhere. This is the real bite of the
critique.”).
72. Owen M. Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 11 (1986).
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., Schauer, Formalism, supra note 34.
75. Id. at 514.
76. Schauer, Easy Cases, supra note 54, at 423. Schauer, of course, maintains
that “cases at the margin are but a small percentage of the full domain of legal
events.” Id. And he takes pains to emphasize that, even in such marginal cases,
legal language “drastically reduces the field of possible solutions, even if it never
reduces that field to one.” Id. at 427.
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length critique of CLS, including a critique of what he called
radical indeterminacy, but he admits the reality of
“moderate” legal indeterminacy, all the while arguing that
it does not undermine the foundations of legal liberalism.77
Brian Leiter has written several scathing attacks on “global
indeterminacy” but writes sympathetically about both
Hart’s moderate linguistic argument for indeterminacy78
and Llewellyn’s moderate interpretive argument for
indeterminacy.79 Ken Kress and Larry Solum take the same
tack—arguing forcefully against radical indeterminacy
while admitting that law is moderately indeterminate or, in
Solum’s phrase, underdeterminate.80 Brian Tamanaha
argues that almost all influential legal thinkers of the past
century and a half have converged on what he calls
“balanced realism”—the recognition that legal rules can
rationally determine a single correct answer in many cases,
but fail to do so in many other cases.81 As far as I can tell, no
77. ANDREW ALTMAN, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: A LIBERAL CRITIQUE 20, 48
(1990) (describing “theoretical premises” of moderate wing of CLS as “basically
sound” and admitting that “there are a number of potential sources of legal
indeterminacy in the system and . . . indeterminacy is a significant phenomenon
in our legal culture.”).
78. LEITER, Legal Realism and Legal Positivism Reconsidered, supra note 2,
at 74 (“I think we can agree with Hart (and I would venture, with commonsense) that legal rules must necessarily be indeterminate in some measure
given the indeterminacy of language itself, and that this type of indeterminacy
resides ‘at the margin of rules.’”); see also Brian Leiter, Legal Indeterminacy, 1
LEGAL THEORY 481, 488 (1995) [hereinafter Leiter, Legal Indeterminacy]
(arguing that attacks on “global indeterminacy” do nothing to disprove “local
rational indeterminacy”).
79. LEITER, Legal Realism and Legal Positivism Reconsidered, supra note 2,
at 75-76 (“Note that . . . the Realists have now given us an additional reason
(beyond Hart’s) to expect indeterminacy in law.”).
80. Kenneth Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 283, 283 (1989) (“I
defend the claim that the indeterminacy [of law] is no more than moderate and
reject critical legal scholars’ arguments for radical indeterminacy.”); Solum, On
the Indeterminacy Crisis, supra note 48, at 503 (admitting the existence of
“underdeterminacy,” defined as the view that some cases lack a uniquely correct
legal resolution, while rejecting “indeterminacy” defined as the view that legal
rules fail to constrain decisionmaking at all).
81. TAMANAHA, supra note 26, at 186 (“Beneath the attacks on sham
opponents that infect the discussion, a balanced realism is what most jurists
have been saying about judging all along.”).
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contemporary legal theorist, apart from the late Ronald
Dworkin, has affirmatively argued for the global
determinacy of law.82
Many of these authors distinguish between easy cases
and hard cases on this basis. Easy cases are those for which
a single correct legal answer is rationally determinable by
existing legal authorities and legitimate interpretive
techniques.83 Hard cases are those for which there is no
single correct legal answer rationally dictated by legal
authorities and legitimate interpretive techniques.84 The
debates among these authors are really about the relative
size of the class of hard cases and easy cases.
In sum, a large and diverse class of theorists has
converged on the thesis of moderate legal indeterminacy.
Moderate legal indeterminacy holds that there are some
legal questions, deemed “hard cases,” for which the law fails
to provide a uniquely correct answer because in such cases,
(a) the semantic meaning of the relevant words of the
applicable legal authority are genuinely open-textured, (b)
the applicable legal authorities are multiple and conflicting,
and/or (c) the legitimate legal interpretive techniques that
can be applied to the relevant legal authority are multiple
and conflicting when applied to the case at hand. According
to moderate indeterminacy, the indeterminacy that exists in
our legal system is not a necessary feature of all law, but is
82. Dworkin, No Right Answer?, supra note 25, at 84 ("For all practical
purposes, there will always be a right answer in the seamless web of our law.”).
83. See William Lucy, Adjudication, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 206, 208-20 (Jules Coleman & Scott
Shapiro eds., 2002) (describing various articulations of the difference between
easy cases and hard cases and related debates). Note that easy cases are not
necessarily easy, trouble-free, or painless to solve; their resolution may require
significant legal skill and effort to identify the correct legal authorities and then
to interpret and apply them correctly.
84. Some commentators have noted that another source of indeterminacy in
law—and thus another reason for the existences of hard cases—comes from the
multiple legitimate ways that exist to characterize the legally significant facts of
a case. See LEITER, A Note on Legal Indeterminacy, supra note 23, at 9. Simply
put, the facts of a case may be amenable to different but equally legitimate
descriptions, which will in turn trigger the application of different rules or
different interpretive techniques.
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an empirical fact about our legal system—and presumably
of any legal system of sufficient complexity. Moreover, the
existence of indeterminate “hard cases” does not mean that
law is globally indeterminate; to the contrary, moderate
indeterminacy accepts that in some significant number of
cases, the relevant legal authorities and relevant legal
conventions do, in fact, determine a single correct outcome.
There are, in other words, “easy cases.” What really divides
legal theorists then is their estimate of the ratio of easy
cases to hard cases. Traditionalists suspect that most cases
are easy, while skeptics suspect that most cases are hard.
Either way, there is broad agreement that some cases are
truly indeterminate; some cases have no single correct
answer.
II. VALUE PLURALISM
Over the past half-century, value pluralism has become
the locus of significant debate across a range of disciplines,
including law,85 moral philosophy,86 economics,87 and

85. See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, Pluralism and Property, 80 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1017 (2011) (arguing for a value pluralist view of social obligation property
theory); Larry Alexander, Introduction to the 2009 Editors’ Symposium: Isaiah
Berlin, Value Pluralism, and the Law, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 753 (2009)
(introducing 10-essay symposium issue on the theme of Isaiah Berlin, value
pluralism, and the law); Hanoch Dagan, Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private
Law, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1409 (2012) (calling for theoretical approaches to
private law that take into account value pluralism); Christopher J. Robinette,
Torts Rationales, Pluralism, and Isaiah Berlin, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 329
(2007) (arguing that Isaiah Berlin’s theory of value pluralism provides “an
excellent framework” for thinking about tort law rationales); Robert D. Sloane,
Human Rights for Hedgehogs?: Global Value Pluralism, International Law, and
Some Reservations of the Fox, 90 B.U. L. REV. 975 (2010) (arguing that value
pluralism offers a better basis for thinking about international human rights
law than monism); Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in
Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779 (1994) (analyzing implication of value pluralism for
various legal and policy issues); Leon Trakman, Pluralism in Contract Law, 58
BUFF. L. REV. 1031 (2010) (explicating a value pluralist approach to contract
law).
86. See, e.g., INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY
supra note 5.
87. See, e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 6, at 55-59.
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political theory.88 And though the recent academic literature
on value pluralism is itself diverse, complex, and
increasingly technical, much of it can be traced back to the
writings of Isaiah Berlin. Probably more than any other
person, Berlin deserves credit for drawing attention to value
pluralism as a distinct normative position and for
articulating its main contours.89 And it is primarily Berlin’s
version of value pluralism that I will describe here.
Berlin never wrote a dedicated argument or defense of
value pluralism.90 His vision of value pluralism, like much of
his substantive philosophy, came out obliquely in a variety
of essays he wrote primarily on the history of ideas. Berlin
traced back the idea of value pluralism to the Renaissance
figure Niccolo Machiavelli and to the CounterEnlightenment writers Johann Gottfried von Herder and
Giambattista Vico, among others.91 And through Berlin’s
88. See, e.g., George Crowder, Pluralism and Liberalism, 42 POL. STUD. 293
(1994).
89. See Robinette, supra note 85, at 330 (“Perhaps no thinker is as closely
identified with the concept of pluralism as the late English philosopher, Sir
Isaiah Berlin.”). This is not to say that all or even most contemporary value
pluralists would sign on to all of Berlin’s thoughts on value pluralism. But it
was Berlin’s articulation of value pluralism that sparked scholarly interest in
the subject. See Maimon Schwarzschild, Pluralism, Conversation, and Judicial
Restraint, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 961, 966 (2001) (noting that value pluralism is
today “most closely identified with the work of Sir Isaiah Berlin”).
90. The closest any of his essays comes to an explicit defense or argument in
favor of value pluralism is his short 1968 essay On the Pursuit of the Ideal.
Berlin, On the Pursuit of the Ideal, supra note 1.
91. See ISAIAH BERLIN, The Originality of Machiavelli, in AGAINST THE
CURRENT: ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 25, 68 (Henry Hardy ed., 1979)
[hereinafter BERLIN, The Originality of Machiavelli]; ISAIAH BERLIN, THREE
CRITICS OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT: VICO, HAMANN, HERDER 176-77 (Henry Hardy
ed., 2000); ISAIAH BERLIN, Vico and the Ideal of Enlightenment, in AGAINST THE
CURRENT: ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 120, 128-29. Berlin was particularly
interested in European and Russian intellectuals who resisted the universalism
and rationalism of the Enlightenment and instead reveled in the particularist,
organic, and contingent aspects of human life. Berlin was not himself in any
sense a foe of the Enlightenment or rational thinking, but he saw in CounterEnlightenment thinkers a valid recognition of the excesses of rationalism and
universalism and the powerful appeal of the particular and communal. ISAIAH
BERLIN & RAMIN JAHANBEGLOO, CONVERSATIONS WITH ISAIAH BERLIN 70-71 (1991)
(“I am interested in the views of the opposition [to the Enlightenment],
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discussion of these thinkers and others, a clear picture of
Berlin’s own value pluralism emerged. In this Part, I will
describe the major outlines of Berlin’s value pluralism,
including some particular implications of, and ambiguities
in, his view.
A. Berlin’s Vision
Berlin argued that the traditional philosophical project
of determining the ultimate good, the ultimate value, in
human life was bound to fail—not because there is no such
thing as an ultimate good (a good in and of itself), but
because there are multiple ultimate goods and not only
one.92 On this account, the ultimate ends of human life are
irreducibly plural. We value—and we are right to value—a
number of goods: e.g., “liberty and equality, spontaneity and
security, happiness and knowledge, mercy and justice.”93
And these are all intrinsic goods, goods in their own right,
not goods instrumental to some other good. There is no
single meta-value to which each of these values can be
reduced.94 Nor is there any common scale or metric by which
we can rank or measure or weigh these goods against one
another. There is, colloquially speaking, no common
currency of value making cross-value trade-offs and
comparisons possible.95 When confronted with two distinct
ultimate goods, such as liberty and equality, we cannot say
that one is of greater value than the other, that one is of

because . . . clever and gifted enemies often pinpoint fallacies or shallow
analyses in the thought of the Enlightenment . . . and exposed [some of its
political implications] as inadequate and, at times, disastrous.”).
92. Berlin, My Intellectual Path, supra note 12, at 11 (“I came to the
conclusion that there is a plurality of ideals . . . .”).
93. Id. at 23 (emphasis added).
94. See ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY
118, 171 (1970) [hereinafter BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty] (“To assume that
all values can be graded on one scale . . . seems to me to falsify our knowledge
that men are free agents . . . .”).
95. One cannot say, for instance, that x amount of liberty is greater or lesser
or equal to y amount of equality.
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lesser value than the other, or that they are of equal value.96
If they are truly distinct ultimate goods, one simply cannot
make the relative comparison. There is no hierarchy or
transitive relation between them. In this sense, our
ultimate values are incommensurable.97
Incommensurability matters to our moral lives because
ultimate values are not all compatible with each other; they
do not all hang together in a harmonious whole.98 Precisely
because they are irreducibly distinct, ultimate values
sometimes come into conflict, forcing individual and public
decisionmakers to choose between these incommensurable
goods.99 True moral dilemmas are those in which the
individual or a group must choose between two (or more)
incommensurable goods. No algorithm or mechanical
decision procedure is even theoretically possible when
facing such a choice, for there is simply no way to quantify
or rank the distinct goods at stake. By way of contrast, a
utilitarian faced with a difficult choice could and would
always ask herself which choice would maximize happiness,
even knowing that precise quantification may not be
possible. On Berlin’s value pluralist view, however, there is
no single value such as happiness that can function either
as the one summum bonum (highest good) or even as a tool
by which to measure other goods. In such cases, the
individual or group must ultimately make a “radical choice”
between the available ultimate ends.100
96. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 322 (1986) [hereinafter RAZ,
THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM] (“A and B are incommensurate if it is neither true
that one is better than the other nor true that they are of equal value.”).
97. In the philosophical literature, there is an important ongoing debate
about what incommensurability means and in particular whether it implies
incomparability. Compare id. (using incommensurability and incompatibility
interchangeably), with Ruth Chang, Introduction to INCOMMENSURABILITY,
INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 5 (distinguishing sharply
between the two concepts of incommensurability and incompatibility).
98. As Berlin wrote, “Everything is what it is: liberty is liberty, not equality
or fairness or justice or culture, or human happiness or a quiet conscience.”
BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, supra note 94, at 125.
99. Id. at 167 (“[C]onflicts of values may be an intrinsic, irremovable element
of human life.”).
100. See GRAY, supra note 19, at 23.
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According to Berlin, true moral dilemmas are tragic
because they inevitably result in the eclipse or sacrifice of
one ultimate value in favor of another.101 Because the values
are ultimate and incommensurable, the loss of one good is
not—cannot be—made up for by the realization of the
other.102 There is no justification or vindication of a radical
choice. Moral dilemmas are tragic, then, not because one
may make the wrong choice, but because whichever choice
one makes, some ultimate good is lost or sacrificed. The word
sacrifice here, it should be clear, does not imply that the
value sacrificed was worth less than the value realized. The
sacrifice in a tragic choice is not an instrumental price one
has to pay for a higher good.103 Berlin’s point is that choices
are tragic precisely when there is no higher good or lower
good, but rather conflicting and incommensurable ultimate
goods.104 In a tragic choice, there is real and unjustifiable
loss no matter which good is ultimately chosen; the
realization of the chosen good does not in any sense redeem
the loss.105 Inevitable and irredeemable loss is what makes
tragic choices tragic.
While Berlin never fully worked out his vision of value
pluralism as a comprehensive meta-ethical theory—thus
leaving himself open to many of the criticisms discussed
below—he was quite clear about the view of ethical life he
was criticizing: namely, monism.106 Ethical monism, for
Berlin, was the belief (really, the illusion) that all moral
101. See BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, supra note 94, at 169 (“If, as I
believe, the ends of men are many, and not all of them are in principle
compatible with each other, then the possibility of conflict—and of tragedy—can
never wholly be eliminated from human life, either personal or social. The
necessity of choosing between absolute claims is then an inescapable
characteristic of the human condition.”).
102. Id. at 125.
103. Id. at 125.
104. Id. at 168-69.
105. Id. at 125 (“[A] sacrifice is not an increase in what is being
sacrificed . . . .”).
106. BERLIN, My Intellectual Path, supra note 12, at 14 (“The enemy of
pluralism is monism – the ancient belief that there is a single harmony of truths
into which everything, if it is genuine, in the end must fit.”).
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questions have a single correct answer, that we can
eventually come to know these right answers, and that
these right answers all cohere with one another.107 The
monist moral universe is harmonious, intelligible, and
ultimately unitary.108 Berlin rejected each element of
monism as false and, moreover, argued that monism
(conscious or not) leads in practice to inhuman results.109
Those who believe that there is one ultimate value, he
suggested, are less constrained in sacrificing other values in
their quest to realize the one ultimate good.110
107. Id. at 5; see also Joshua Cherniss & Henry Hardy, Isaiah Berlin, THE
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY Ch. 4.1 (May 25, 2010),
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/berlin.
108. Note here how closely ethical monism resembles Langdellian formalism:
There is one right answer to each question, we can know the answer, and all of
the answers hang together in a coherent system. See KRONMAN, THE LOST
LAWYER, supra note 49, at 174.
109. See BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, supra note 94, at 171 (arguing that
pluralism is “more humane” then monism because pluralism, unlike monism,
“does not . . . deprive men, in the name of some remote, or incoherent, ideal, of
much that they have found to be indispensable to their life as unpredictably
self-transforming human beings”).
110. Id. at 167. Berlin was, of course, most concerned with monism in politics
and characterized monism as the heart of totalitarianism. Those who seek
utopia, he believed, would be willing to pay any moral price to get there, for
after all, the achievement of utopia would redeem the means. “[Monism] is
responsible for the slaughter of individuals on the altars of the great historical
ideals—justice or progress or happiness of future generations, or the sacred
mission or emancipation of a nation or race or class, or even liberty itself . . . .”
Id. Berlin made the point even more starkly in On the Pursuit of the Ideal:
The possibility of a final solution – even if we forget the terrible sense
that these words acquired in Hitler’s day – turns out to be an illusion;
and a very dangerous one. For if one really believes that such a solution
is possible, then surely no cost would be too high to obtain it: to make
mankind just and happy and creative and harmonious for ever – what
could be too high a price to pay for that? To make such an omelette,
there is surely no limit to the number of eggs that should be broken –
that was the faith of Lenin, of Trotsky, of Mao, for all I know, of Pol
Pot. Since I know the only true path to the ultimate solution of the
problem of society, I know which way to drive the human caravan; and
since you are ignorant of what I know, you cannot be allowed to have
liberty of choice even within the narrowest limits, if the goal is to be
reached.
Berlin, On the Pursuit of the Ideal, supra note 1, at 16.
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Berlin criticized utilitarianism’s focus on a single value
(happiness) and on a single ultimate standard of conduct
(maximize happiness) both because utilitarianism fails to
capture the irreducible plurality of ultimate values and
because, he argued, it would lead utilitarians to disregard,
indeed to trample on, ultimate values outside their narrow
calculus with morally catastrophic results.111 Berlin was, of
course, hardly alone in criticizing utilitarianism for its
potential to justify immoral means in the pursuit of
maximizing ends.112 The key point of Berlin’s pluralist
critique of utilitarianism was that the latter fails to take
into account values other than happiness (or utility,
however defined).113 This fundamental error in moral
ontology leads utilitarians to misconceive of moral
deliberation as essentially a form of calculus or
computation. Berlin’s pluralism was equally critical of any
monistic normative theory, be it the Kantian insistence on a
categorical imperative or the Aristotelian theory of the
“unity of the virtues.”114 It was Berlin’s rejection of these
major traditions of Western meta-ethics—and the monist
project in its entirety—that makes him a radical thinker.115
111. For a discussion of Berlin’s criticisms of utilitarianism in an unpublished
essay called “Utilitarianism,” see JOSHUA L. CHERNISS, A MIND AND ITS TIME: THE
DEVELOPMENT OF ISAIAH BERLIN’S POLITICAL THOUGHT 10 (2013), and see also
URSULA K. LE GUIN, The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas, in THE WIND’S
TWELVE QUARTERS 275, 282 (1975) (story of utopian town whose good fortune
requires torture of one unlucky child).
112. See, e.g., J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM:
(Williams’s criticisms of utilitarianism).

FOR AND

AGAINST 77-150 (1973)

113. Or, to put it another way, utilitarianism falsely holds that all values can
be reduced ultimately to happiness.
114. See GRAY, supra note 19, at 43. For discussion of Ancient Greek
philosophical views on the unity of the virtues, see Edward Halper, The Unity of
the Virtues in Aristotle, 17 OXFORD STUD. IN ANCIENT PHIL. 115, 115 (David
Sedley ed., 1999); Terry Penner, The Unity of Virtue, 82 PHIL. REV. 35 (1973).
115. See GRAY, supra note 19, at 43 (“Berlin rejects this foundational Western
commitment. He denies that genuine goods, or authentic virtues, are,
necessarily, or as a matter of fact, such that peaceful coexistence among them is
a possible state of human life.”). To call Berlin radical strikes some people as
counter-intuitive because he cultivated an air of respectability and, indeed,
often defended the status quo Anglo-American small-l liberalism. I agree with
John Gray, however, that Berlin’s pluralism (even if not wholly original) marked
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Berlin’s dedication to moral pluralism should not,
however, be misinterpreted as an endorsement of
subjectivism or relativism.116 Berlin never argued that moral
evaluation is impossible across the board or that all
asserted values are as good as any other. For Berlin, the
ultimate ends of human life are multiple, but finite.117 There
is a common “human horizon” of ultimate values that makes
moral communication possible and moral praise and
condemnation credible.118 Some ends that people espouse—
e.g., racial supremacy—are not in fact real human values at
all.119 And some goods that people seek are valuable only
instrumentally—material wealth, for instance. Still other
values are, in fact, reducible or describable in terms of more
fundamental ends. Value pluralism is not a license to moral
apathy or indifference; some courses of action are morally
better than others, and thinking through moral choices can
help us identify better and worse options. Value pluralism is
not meant to short-circuit genuine reflection when faced
with difficult choices. Indeed, reflection and deliberation are
necessary to determine as a threshold matter whether one
in fact faces a true moral dilemma or not, for on Berlin’s
account, not every choice is a tragic choice.120 Sometimes,

him as a radical thinker vis-à-vis the conventional ethical theories of his day.
See id.
116. BERLIN, My Intellectual Path, supra note 12, at 11 (“I am not a
relativist.”). For a contrary reading of Berlin, one arguing that his value
pluralism is ultimately indistinguishable from ethical relativism, see Leo
Strauss, “Relativism,” in RELATIVISM AND THE STUDY OF MAN (Helmut Schoeck
and James W. Wiggins eds., 1961).
117. Berlin, On the Pursuit of the Ideal, supra note 1, at 15.
118. Id. (“Ends, moral principles, are many. But not infinitely many: they
must be within the human horizon. If they are not, then they are outside the
human sphere.”).
119. See BERLIN, My Intellectual Path, supra note 12, at 11 (“I do not say ‘I like
my coffee with milk and you like it without; I am in favour of kindness and you
prefer concentration camps . . . .’”).
120. Berlin, On the Pursuit of the Ideal, supra note 1, at 16 (“It is true that
some problems can be solved, some ills cured, in both the individual and social
life.”).
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there is one right answer.121 In short, Berlin’s value
pluralism is consistent with a view that morality is objective
and that there is a finite core set of values common to all of
humanity, despite difference in their manifestations across
cultures and time.122 Berlin referred to his own view as
“objective pluralism.”123
Crucially, Berlin believed that communication about
values was possible even among those who made different
moral
choices.
Although
ultimate
values
are
incommensurable, and there is no common currency
between them, human beings are capable of understanding
and assessing the value choices of others, even of foreign or
historical cultures.124 Respecting pluralism at the individual
or social level does not entail blanket non-judgmentalism,
according to Berlin.125 Rather, respecting pluralism entails
recognizing the variety, but not the infinity, of legitimate
choices available to individuals and groups navigating the
world.126 Thus, even those who disagree about a particular
121. See id. Note the parallel to moderate indeterminacy in law: some cases
and dilemmas lack a single correct answer, but some cases and dilemmas do
have a single correct answer.
122. BERLIN, My Intellectual Path, supra note 12, at 12 (“I think these values
are objective – that is to say, their nature, the pursuit of them, is part of what it
is to be a human being, and this is an objective given.”).
123. Henry Hardy, Berlin’s Big Idea, PHILOSOPHERS’ MAG., Summer 2000, at
15-16 (“That is why Berlin himself sometimes described his view as ‘objective
pluralism’, to make clear that it occupied a genuine third position between
monism and relativism.”).
124. Berlin, On the Pursuit of the Ideal, supra note 1, at 15. Berlin stated:
I am not blind to what the Greeks valued – their values may not be
mine, but I can grasp what it would be like to live by their light, I can
admire and respect them, and even imagine myself as pursuing them,
although I do not – and do not wish to, and perhaps could not if I
wished.
Id. Such mutual understanding also made Berlin’s brand of intellectual history
possible.
125. BERLIN, My Intellectual Path, supra note 12, at 11-12 (“I do not say ‘I like
my coffee with milk and you like it without; I am in favour of kindness and you
prefer concentration camps’ – each of us with his own values . . . . I find Nazi
values detestable . . . .”).
126. Id. at 12 (“I do believe that there is a plurality of values which men can
and do seek, and that these values differ. There is not an infinity of them . . . .”).
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choice between legitimate ultimate ends—e.g., between
liberty and security—can understand the concerns and
claims of the other as legitimate moral claims.127 The moral
stakes will be mutually intelligible. We may not choose to
follow the way somebody else, or some other society,
prioritizes ultimate values, but Berlin argues that our
common “human horizon” allows us to understand the
legitimate moral motivations at play on the other side. 128
Indeed, we may even come to change our own moral or
political choices through exposure to, or communication
with, other moral agents and other ways of life.
It bears emphasizing in this Article that Berlin’s
insistence on plural values comes primarily in the context of
political and social choices, not only in personal ethical
decisions.129 In fact, Berlin located the emergence of value
pluralism as a distinctive idea in Niccolo Machiavelli’s
political treatise The Prince.130 Machiavelli’s key insight,
according to Berlin, was in recognizing the irreconcilability
between Christian morality and the values of prudent
statecraft.131 On Berlin’s account, Machiavelli did not argue
that one set of morals was better than another, only that
they could not both be realized together, and a political
leader must choose between them.132 Likewise, Berlin’s first
sustained discussion of value pluralism comes in his
celebrated essay, Two Concepts of Liberty, and it is
127. Id. at 12-13 (“[O]f course, if I pursue one set of values I may detest
another . . . I may even – in extreme cases – have to go to war against it. But I
still recognise it as a human pursuit.”).
128. Berlin, On the Pursuit of the Ideal, supra note 1, at 15. Of course, Berlin’s
version of objective pluralism also authorizes us to criticize and condemn other
people and other societies when they stray from genuine ultimate values. And
vice versa.
129. Berlin conceived of political theory as a branch of moral philosophy.
BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, supra note 94, at 120 (“[P]olitical theory is a
branch of moral philosophy . . . .”).
130. BERLIN, The Originality of Machiavelli, supra note 91, at 68 (arguing that
it was “Machiavelli who lit the fatal fuse” of the pluralist revolt against
monism).
131. Id. at 71.
132. Id. at 75.
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explicitly about the irreducible multiplicity of political
values.133 Although that essay is often misread as a brief in
favor of negative liberty above other values, Berlin writes
that “neither political equality nor efficient organization nor
social justice is compatible with more than a modicum of
individual liberty, and certainly not with unrestricted
laissez-faire.”134 The thrust of Berlin’s argument is not that
negative liberty is the only value worth respecting in public
life, but rather that negative liberty should not be
subsumed into, or confused with, other legitimate political
values—values like equality, efficiency, or social justice.135
Berlin’s chief target in Two Concepts was political ideology
such as scientific Marxism that purported to resolve once
and for all the ends of social life and turn politics into a
technical process of achieving a preordained end.136 Berlin’s
defense of liberalism rested chiefly on liberalism’s
acceptance that disagreement about ends forms a natural
part of human and political life.137 Liberalism’s virtue,
according to Berlin, is that it seeks to manage
disagreements about values in a peaceful manner and
affords individuals a considerable zone of freedom within
which to make choices about their ends; it does not dream of
any “final solution”138 to value conflicts.139

133. See BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, supra note 94, at 118.
134. Id. at 167.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 118.
137. Id. at 171-72.
138. Berlin, On the Pursuit of the Ideal, supra note 1, at 16 (“[T]he very notion
of a final solution is not only impracticable but, if I am right, and some values
cannot but clash, incoherent also.”).
139. BERLIN, The Originality of Machiavelli, supra note 91, at 171-72. Berlin’s
thoughts on the relationship between value pluralism and political liberalism
have sparked considerable debate. Compare GRAY, supra note 19, at 141-68
(arguing against any necessary connection between pluralism and liberalism),
with WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PLURALISM 48-64 (2002) (defending Berlin’s
argument of a connection between pluralism and liberalism), and GEORGE
CROWDER, ISAIAH BERLIN: LIBERTY AND PLURALISM (2004) (same).
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B. Ambiguities and Criticisms
As Berlin’s thesis of value pluralism has become the
object of academic study over the past two or three decades,
scholars have pointed to a number of ambiguities and
perceived shortcomings in his account.140 Berlin’s vision of
pluralism is clear in its outlines, but leaves many key
details blank or ambiguous. Most obviously, Berlin never
filled in his portrait of pluralism with a conclusive list of
ultimate values. Though Berlin identified a number of core
human values, such as equality and liberty, among others,
he never tried to provide anything like a definitive pantheon
of ultimate values.141 This gap in Berlin’s theory is troubling
if one wants it to serve as a comprehensive account of
human morality, but it was never Berlin’s aim to provide a
fully elaborated substantive theory of ultimate human
goods. Nor is such detail necessary to make the case that
ultimate human values are diverse, incommensurable, and
not always harmonious.
Scholars have also considered Berlin’s views about the
objectivity of ultimate values. It is unclear whether Berlin
believed that values can be derived from some universal
feature(s) of human nature or human experience or if they
are simply human-created and artificial but nevertheless
gain objectivity due to near-universal allegiance.142 At times,
Berlin suggested that there is a “common horizon”143 of
140. For a taste of these debates, see THE LEGACY
Dworkin et al. eds., 2001).

OF

ISAIAH BERLIN (Ronald

141. Berlin wrote regarding values: “There is not an infinity of them: the
number of human values . . . is finite – let us say 74, or perhaps 122, or 26, but
finite, whatever it may be.” BERLIN, My Intellectual Path, supra note 12, at 12;
cf. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 85-90 (1980) (describing a
finite list of “basic forms of human good” from a natural law perspective); JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 433 (1971) [hereinafter RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE] (describing “liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and above all
self-respect” as the “primary goods . . . necessary for the framing and the
execution of a rational plan of life”).
142. GRAY, supra note 19, at 66-70 (discussing ambiguities in Berlin’s account
of human nature and its relation to ultimate values). Berlin’s agnosticism seems
to preclude any commitment to a divine or supernatural source of morality.
143. BERLIN & JAHANBEGLOO, supra note 91, at 108.
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human experience that gives rise to common human ends,144
but at other points, he appeared sympathetic to the view
that there is no stable human nature and only a collection of
different ways of being human.145 Berlin specialists and
metaphysicians may find these questions pressing, but for
our purposes, it matters very little exactly what Berlin’s
views were on the mutability of human nature or the nature
of moral objectivity.
The key is to distinguish Berlin’s pluralism from moral
nihilism or relativism, for Berlin was clearly a moral realist
of some kind—for him, values really exist146—and rejected
the idea that ultimate values were relative to only a
particular person or culture.147 Berlin believed, contra
relativists, that genuine moral disagreement and
communication between individuals and peoples was
possible. Moral disagreement is not just a question of
differing tastes—I like chocolate; you like vanilla; there is
144. ISAIAH BERLIN, CONCEPTS AND CATEGORIES 164-65 (Henry Hardy ed.,
1978) [hereinafter BERLIN, CONCEPTS AND CATEGORIES] (“[T]here exist central
features of our experience that are invariant and omnipresent, or at least much
less variable than the vast variety of its empirical characteristics . . . .”); BERLIN,
My Intellectual Path, supra note 12, at 12 (“I think these values are objective –
that is to say, their nature, the pursuit of them, is part of what it is to be a
human being, and this is an objective given.”); BERLIN, On the Pursuit of the
Ideal, supra note 1, at 15 (“There is a world of objective values.”).
145. John Gray argued that Berlin paradoxically located human nature
precisely in man’s capacity for self-creation and choice-making, a capacity which
inevitably results in great diversity. GRAY, supra note 19, at 71-74.
146. BERLIN, My Intellectual Path, supra note 12, at 12 (“The fact that men are
men and women are women and not dogs or cats or tables or chairs is an
objective fact; and part of this objective fact is that there are certain values, and
only those values, which men, while remaining men, can pursue.”). Berlin was
both a value pluralist and an ethical realist, but it is certainly possible to be a
value pluralist and a non-realist about value. See Elinor Mason, Value
Pluralism, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Jul. 29, 2011),
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/value-pluralism (“One could
be a pluralist and an objectivist or realist, and one could also be a pluralist and
a non-realist. The question about whether values are plural or monist is a
question about the shape of morality—in particular, about how many values
moral theory must deal with.”).
147. BERLIN, My Intellectual Path, supra note 12, at 11 (“I am not a
relativist.”). On the other hand, Berlin did believe that some values are confined
to only a certain time and society—e.g., sincerity. See id. at 13.
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nothing more to say148—for that is not a disagreement at all.
For Berlin, there is some common plain of morality upon
which people can come to affirm, discuss, and fight over
values.149 The realm of values is not something idiosyncratic
to a particular individual or society. Rather, some things
have real value for human beings, and others do not—not
just relatively speaking, but objectively.150 Even if it turns
out (as it does) that some moral questions have multiple
right answers, Berlin believed, human beings can still
intelligently deliberate with each other about moral
questions and seek right answers. The fact that ultimate
values—and thus right answers to specific questions—are
plural does not mean that they are infinite.151 “All human
beings must have some common values,” Berlin wrote, “or
they cease to be human, and also some different values else
they cease to differ, as in fact they do.”152
148. Berlin expressly rejected moral relativism. See id. at 10-11; see also
BERLIN, On the Pursuit of the Ideal, supra note 1, at 14 (rejecting “I prefer
coffee, you prefer champagne” as a description of his pluralism).
149. Berlin expounded on this theme:
Members of one culture can, by the force of imaginative insight,
understand (what Vico called entrare) the values, the ideals, the forms
of life of another culture or society, even those remote in time or space.
They may find these values unacceptable, but if they open their minds
sufficiently they can grasp how one might be a full human being, with
whom one could communicate, and at the same time live in the light of
values widely different from one’s own, but which nevertheless one can
see to be values, ends of life, by the realization of which men could be
fulfilled.
BERLIN, On the Pursuit of the Ideal, supra note 1, at 14.
150. See BERLIN, My Intellectual Path, supra note 12, at 12 (“That is why
pluralism is not relativism – the multiple values are objective, part of the
essence of humanity rather than arbitrary creations of men’s subjective
fancies.”).
151. Recall, too, that for Berlin, not all choices are tragic choices, so when
somebody chooses to act in accord with no genuine value, moral condemnation is
completely appropriate. For example, Berlin’s pluralism would have no problem
condemning Camus’ stranger for killing a man on the beach for trivial (or no)
reasons. The value of the man’s life is not even plausibly in conflict with some
other value that would make killing him a difficult, much less tragic, choice. Cf.
ALBERT CAMUS, THE STRANGER (1946).
152. See BERLIN, My Intellectual Path, supra note 12, at 12.
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C. The Incommensurability Debate
The central concept of incommensurability has also
been the subject of significant philosophical attention in the
years since Berlin first articulated his vision of value
pluralism.153 Incommensurability at its core refers to a lack
of a common measure between objects. To say of two values
that they are incommensurable is to say that there is no
measure common between them. Joseph Raz defines
incommensurability thus: “A and B are incommensurate if
it is neither true that one is better than the other nor true
that they are of equal value.”154 Some theorists hold that
incommensurability implies incomparability—that a lack of
common
measure
necessarily
renders
comparison
impossible.155 Others argue that values (or their bearers)
may lack a common measure yet still be compared to one
another, perhaps in some qualitative or situation-specific
manner.156 Berlin did not set out his views on the precise
relationship
between
incommensurability
and
incomparability, but for him, the incommensurability of
diverse values meant, at minimum, that ranking them in
the abstract was not possible and that choosing between
them could not be a matter of logic, quantification, or
hierarchical ordering.157 Of course, human beings cannot
help but make concrete choices among goods—indeed, that
is part of what makes us human158—but Berlin maintained
that when two distinct and ultimate values clash, the lack
of common measure implies that the choice between them

153. See, e.g., INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY
supra note 5.

AND

PRACTICAL REASON,

154. RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 96, at 322.
155. See, e.g., id.
156. See, e.g., Chang, supra note 97.
157. See GRAY, supra note 19, at 53 (“[N]o hierarchy can be established by any
rational procedure among such diverse forms of human flourishing.”).
158. BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, supra note 94, at 169 (“The necessity of
choosing between absolute claims is then an inescapable characteristic of the
human condition.”).
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is, in the abstract at least, fundamentally arational.159 Just
as legal indeterminacy posits that the law may simply run
out in hard cases, Berlin’s pluralism posits that reason may
simply run out in the face of genuine moral dilemmas.160
Finally, Berlin’s account of value pluralism leaves open
the question of just how pervasive incommensurable choices
among values really are in our personal and political lives.
For Berlin, the incommensurability of human values is a
necessary and constitutive fact about the world, given the
diversity of legitimate values; it is not just an empirical or
contingent fact. “The very idea of the perfect world in which
all good things are realised,” he wrote, “is incomprehensible
. . . conceptually incoherent . . . not merely unattainable but

159. Cf. RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 96, at 334
(“Incomparability . . . marks the inability of reason to guide our action, not the
insignificance of our choice.”). Some argue that Berlin endorsed only a moderate
incommensurability according to which even incommensurable goods could be
rationally compared and ranked in concrete situations. See Robinette, supra
note 85, at 340; Dag Einar Thorsen, Value Pluralism and Normative Reasoning
(2004), available at http://folk.uio.no/daget/Value%20Pluralism%20and%20
Normative%20Reasoning.pdf. If so, Berlin nowhere explained what kind of
rational decisionmaking process could be brought to bear in such situations. My
own view is that Berlin believed that some kind of “practical reasoning” was
possible, but that such reasoning was not a rational process that itself led to one
correct answer. See infra Part IV. If there were a rational procedure for choosing
between two genuine ultimate goods, then value pluralism would lose the tragic
sense that pervades Berlin’s discussion of pluralism. Value pluralism is tragic,
for Berlin, because one cannot reason to a uniquely correct answer in tragic
cases. At best, one can take everything into consideration, narrow the choices
down to the ones that represent genuine values, and then choose with “eyes
wide open.”
160. Late in life, Berlin wrote that clashes between incommensurable values
cannot be avoided, but may at least be “softened” through some sense of balance
or compromise. BERLIN, On the Pursuit of the Ideal, supra note 1, at 18. “[I]n
concrete situations not every claim is of equal force,” he wrote, and “[p]riorities
. . . must be established.” Id. As the passive construction implies, Berlin did not
provide any suggestion about how to establish priorities or how to know when a
decent balance has been struck among ultimate values. Indeed, to the questions
“How do we choose between possibilities? What and how much must we sacrifice
to what?,” he wrote, “There is, it seems to me, no clear reply.” Id. at 17. In Part
IV, I will give an account of what decisionmaking among incommensurable
alternatives might consist of, if one accepts Berlin’s account of
incommensurability. See infra Part IV.
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inconceivable.”161 At the level of abstract values, then,
incommensurability is not just an occasional feature, but
part of the very fabric of the moral universe. John Gray
argues that Berlin saw incommensurability as “pretty
pervasive in human life”—not simply that there are
“occasional pockets” of it.162 Other authors have argued that,
at the level of concrete choices, incommensurability is rare
or perhaps even non-existent.163 Seizing on Berlin’s
statement that “[i]n concrete situations not every claim is of
equal force,” George Crowder argued that “[r]easoned
ranking of plural values is impossible in the abstract, but
apparently unproblematic in particular cases. What makes
the difference is evidently the presence in particular cases
of a concrete context for choice.”164 But Berlin never
suggested that context can always determine a single right
answer to questions implicating multiple values. Berlin, in
other words, rejects both the extreme view that
incommensurability renders all or almost-all concrete
choices arational and the opposite extreme view that
incommensurability has no implications for concrete
choices. Berlin believed that deliberation about all contextspecific facts, concerns, and consequences had utility to a
decisionmaker facing a tragic case.165 But, at the same time,
161. See BERLIN, My Intellectual Path, supra note 12, at 23.
162. GRAY, supra note 19, at 59; cf. GEORGE CROWDER, LIBERALISM
PLURALISM 52 (2002).

AND

VALUE

163. See, e.g., Brett G. Scharffs, Adjudication and the Problems of
Incommensurability, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1367, 1375 (2001) [hereinafter
Scharffs, Adjudication and the Problems of Incommensurability] (“I argue that
incommensurable values and choices that vindicate incommensurable values
are ubiquitous. In contrast, choices that are genuinely incomparable are
extremely rare.”).
164. George Crowder, Communications, 44 POL. STUD. 649, 650 (1996).
Crowder is committed to the view that incommensurability does not mean
incomparability at the level of particular choices implicating distinct values.
CROWDER, supra note 162, at 50-60. My own view is that, for Berlin,
incommensurability does bleed down from abstract values to concrete choices,
but that in making concrete choices in tragic cases, context-specific ‘practical
wisdom’ may be brought to bear. See infra Part IV. Nevertheless, practical
wisdom does not provide a logic or standard demanding one right answer. Due
to incommensurability, some concrete choices have multiple right answers.
165. See infra Part IV.
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he held that context-specific factors may fail in many cases
to provide decisive reasons for choosing one valuable course
over another. Both choices will lead to irredeemable loss;
both choices will vindicate some real good, and there is no
measure which can tell us which loss or which good is worth
more or less.
III. THE INTERACTION OF INDETERMINACY AND
INCOMMENSURABILITY
A. Tragic Cases and Other Categories
On a Venn diagram, tragic cases exist where the circles
of hard cases and tragic choices overlap. Not every hard
case poses a tragic choice, and not every tragic choice makes
it to court packaged as a hard case.166 But, if the versions of
legal indeterminacy and value pluralism I have described
are true, then significant numbers of cases are both legally
indeterminate and require choices among incommensurably
different values. Many of the most vexing cases in
Constitutional law are tragic cases. The text of the
Constitution, the existing authoritative doctrine, and the
modalities of Constitutional and precedential interpretation
leave open multiple possible resolutions (hence,
indeterminacy), and there are weighty and divergent
ultimate values at stake whichever way the Court decides
the case (hence, incommensurability). Abortion, affirmative
action, property rights, federal health care regulation—
almost all of the high-profile cases in these areas that reach
the Supreme Court could be classed in the category of tragic
cases.167

166. Most tragic choices are simply not legal cases at all.
167. Of course, I would need to be much more specific about why I think the
law is indeterminate in the areas listed above and why I think conflicting
ultimate values are at stake in order to prove that any particular case is, in fact,
a tragic case. But I am relying here on an intuition that the kind of cases which
make it to the Supreme Court and incite significant public controversy are likely
(though not necessarily) the kind of cases in which neither the law nor morality
provide a uniquely correct answer. Tragic cases are, of course, not limited to
Constitutional law; they appear in any field any time the law fails to rationally
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At the same time, judges are routinely confronted with
cases that are ethically tragic but legally determinate. In
other words, many legal disputes are easy cases as a matter
of law, even though their resolution requires a choice among
incommensurable values. This is particularly important to
emphasize because, in such cases, the law proves its
capacity to determine legal outcomes even in treacherous
normative terrain. A legal decisionmaker, after all, screens
off many considerations which an all-things-considered
sensitive decisionmaker may take into account.168 Thus,
there are cases which really do have only one right legal
answer, despite having multiple right answers in the realm
of ethics or public policy. The legal system, in those cases,
shields off potential resolutions that would be available
outside the realm of the law.169 All of the vexing
Constitutional disputes I characterized as tragic above
nevertheless become legally determinate after the Supreme
Court decides a particular case. For example, each
wrenching decision about affirmative action or abortion lays
down a precedent that is binding at least on subsequent
disputes that fall under the relevant rule for that kind of
dispute.170 The conflicting moral values at stake in
determine the outcome of the case and the available choices manifest clashing
ultimate values.
168. Schauer, Formalism, supra note 34, at 510 (describing one purpose of
legal rules as “screening off from a decisionmaker factors that a sensitive
decisionmaker would otherwise take into account.”).
169. Id. at 539 (“Once we understand that rules get in the way, that they gain
their ruleness by cutting off access to factors that might lead to the best
resolution in a particular case, we see that rules function as impediments to
optimally sensitive decisionmaking.”). Obviously, someone who believed in
global indeterminacy would not recognize a category of cases which are legally
determinate but implicate incommensurable values. But those, like me, who
argue for localized indeterminacy, however, must acknowledge that class of
cases.
170. Of course, there may continue to be legitimate debates about what
constitutes the class of disputes covered by a rule laid down in a Supreme Court
decision, but the fact that there may be genuine indeterminacy about whether
some particular future cases may be covered by the rule does not mean that
there is genuine indeterminacy about whether all future cases are covered by
the rule or not. The Court is capable of drafting sufficiently clear rules that
some future cases will be covered by the new rule and thereby determined.
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subsequent cases remain the same as they were in cases
prior to the authoritative opinion of the Court, so the new
disputes are just as tragic in the realm of values.171 But the
intervening opinion of the Court authoritatively settles the
legal question in dispute, so for better or for worse there is a
legally determinate answer.172 As a matter of law, such
cases are routine and unproblematic, but as a matter of
values, they might best be seen as routine tragedies.173
B. The Sting of Tragic Cases
At root, both legal indeterminacy and value pluralism
are arguments of surfeit, not scarcity: it is not that we have
no good reasons for acting; to the contrary, there are too
many compelling reasons for acting, and thus too many
compelling choices. The claim of (moderate) legal
indeterminacy174 is that, in hard cases, there exists a surfeit
of valid legal authorities and legitimate modes of
interpreting and manipulating them. The claim of value
pluralism175 is that, in tragic choices, there exists a surfeit of
171. The very existence of an authoritative opinion might add an extra value—
legal stability—on the side of the litigant who claims reliance on the
authoritative rule.
172. Of course, a lawyer must recognize the possibility that decisions are on
occasion overturned, and the substance of the law is not unalterably fixed.
Lawyers can and do ask courts to change existing law. But the possibility of a
high court overturning a previously authoritative rule does not mean that all
cases are rationally indeterminate; it just means that some rules are subject to
unpredictable change through the litigation process. To say that a case is
rationally determinate is not to say that it is 100% predictable. What a court
will actually do is just a different question from what the law requires—another
key insight of Legal Realism. Likewise, to say that what courts will do is 100%
predictable is different from saying that the law is globally rationally
determinate. What courts will actually do might be determined by factors other
than law. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism, supra note 2, at 1239; see
also Frederick Schauer, Legal Realism Untamed, 91 TEX. L. REV. 749 (2013)
[hereinafter Schauer, Legal Realism Untamed] (giving the example of the gap
between the posted speed limits and the actual speeds at which a judge will
impose penalties).
173. For a discussion of how law attempts to routinely resolve tragic choices,
see GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978).
174. See discussion supra Part I.
175. See discussion supra Part II.
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incommensurable goods to choose from. What makes this
overabundance tragic in both law and ethics is the necessity
of choice and the fact that each compelling choice requires
foregoing other compelling choices. An embarrassment of
riches is wonderful when one can gaze upon a room (or
universe) full of valuable things and revel in its richness
and diversity. It becomes a problem when one must choose
among the goods and one wants to do so by proffering
reasons for the choice, not mere personal preference.176 The
abstract existence of multiple values, or multiple legal
authorities, is not a practical problem—only an intellectual
one. But when circumstances demand that we choose among
concrete goods bearing conflicting values or between legal
disputants both making persuasive and opposing legal
arguments, then we are faced with a practical problem—
how to choose?
To be sure, an American judge confronting a tragic case
has some tools to resist making a decisive choice. Alexander
Bickel described the “passive virtues” to point out the
various strategies and doctrines judges have available for
avoiding substantive choices and to suggest that judges
should avail themselves of these doctrines more often.177
But, even granting Bickel’s argument that the Supreme
Court should embrace the passive virtues more often in
Constitutional cases, the point of establishing courts of
law—and other institutions of dispute resolution—is
precisely to lodge decisionmaking authority in some
institutional actors. Such institutions would fail their
charge if they avoided too many substantive decisions in the
name of prudence. Decisionmaking—choosing the right
resolution to a dispute—is the judge’s social function.178

176. For a defense of basing judicial decisions in tragic cases on personal
preference, see Eric J. Miller, Judicial Preference, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1275 (2008)
[hereinafter Miller, Judicial Preference].
177. Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term—Foreword: The
Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 48-50 (1961) (recommending prudential
use of doctrines of avoidance).
178. Delaying or avoiding a substantive decision is, a decision in its own right
too. Where there is a dispute or an open question, any response from a
designated decisionmaker is ipso facto a decision. Somebody (some body)—a
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The abundance of legally authoritative and ethically
valid reasons to resolve a legal dispute might appear as
good news for the judge, at first. She is not faced with a
void; there is guidance. There will be a right answer.179 She
can apply the law to the facts and generate an outcome. The
problem comes with the realization that there are multiple
and conflicting right answers—too much law, too many
interpretive techniques, too many ultimate values. In short,
there are multiple right answers, and each right answer
requires eliding or rejecting or foregoing other right
answers, other answers of equivalent or incommensurable
validity. Each choice implies irreplaceable loss; indeed, for
judges, each choice implies a losing litigant. Moreover, in
choosing which party shall lose, the judge has a professional
obligation to give reasons, public reasons, for the resolution
she chooses.180 How to rationally justify a particular
resolution is precisely the problem of tragic cases for the
legal decisionmaker.181
C. Jurisprudential Implications and the Case of Ronald
Dworkin
The argument up to here can be fairly summarized as
follows: if one accepts moderate legal indeterminacy and
value pluralism, then there are some legal cases that are
both legally indeterminate and require choosing among
person or institutional body—must bear the weight of decisionmaking; hence,
the necessity of choice.
179. There is not, however, only one right answer in tragic cases; there are
multiple right answers.
180. See Eric J. Miller, Permissive Justification 45 (Loyola Law Sch. L.A.,
Legal Studies Paper No. 2013-29, 2013) [hereinafter Miller, Permissive
Justification],
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2314678
(“What
distinguishes judicial decision-making from its lay equivalents is that the judge
is, in virtue of her role, peculiarly required to explain how her reasons for
decision apply, not only to herself, but to everyone.”). This might be deemed a
public relations problem, a problem of how to “sell” a decision. But my interest
here is not in the public relations problem, but in the internal decisionmaking
problem of a person who is obliged to, and wants to, give reasons for his or her
decisions.
181. Cf. id. (discussing what kinds of reasons are legitimate in indeterminate
cases).
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incommensurable values. I call such cases tragic cases, as
they are simultaneously hard cases in a Legal Realist sense
and tragic choices in a value pluralist sense.
Recognizing tragic cases has some immediate
implications for normative jurisprudence.182 First, and most
obviously, it means that the attempt to devise a
determinate decisionmaking procedure for judges to apply
in all cases is bound to fail. More precisely, it means that
global rational determinacy is not possible in the law; the
conventional methods of legal analysis cannot provide
rational justification in all cases and neither can non-legal
norms. In tragic cases, the law and its conventions yield too
many answers, and the values at stake are
incommensurable. Seen in the light of tragic cases, all
attempts to fashion a comprehensive right way to decide
cases is conceptually flawed; no such procedure or group of
procedures exists.
Berlin once defined monism as the belief that (1) “all
genuine questions must have one true answer and one only,
all the rest being necessarily errors”; (2) “that there must be
a dependable path towards the discovery of these truths”;
and (3) “that the true answers, when found, must
necessarily be compatible with one another and form a
single whole, for one truth cannot be incompatible with
another.”183 Many of the most prominent jurisprudential
projects of the past century—Langdellian formalism,184
normative law and economics,185 and rights-based liberal
182. Normative jurisprudence, as I use the term here, means thinking about
how legal decisionmakers ought to decide cases. Of course, jurisprudence writ
largely includes many other projects and need not be as judge-focused as it
tends to be in American law schools. See Robin West, The Missing
Jurisprudence of the Legislated Constitution, THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 79
(Jack M. Balkin and Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009).
183. Berlin, On the Pursuit of the Ideal, supra note 1, at 12.
184. See KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER, supra note 49, at 174 (describing the
Langdellian System).
185. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 24-25 (7th ed. 2007)
(describing efficiency as chief value of analysis in normative law and economics);
see also NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 4 (1994) (“The economic approach to legal
analysis is cast in terms of a single social goal – resource allocation efficiency.”).
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legalism186—have been monist in precisely this sense; they
have taken the “one right answer” thesis as a premise and
then go in search of the “dependable path” toward finding
that one right answer. If value pluralism is true, then such
approaches, at least in their most uncompromising versions,
are false.
The CLS movement, to its credit, understood that
monistic normative theories of adjudication were dead
ends.187 While some CLS authors flirted with global
indeterminacy in law and with complete relativism or
subjectivism in ethics—all positions I reject—those radical
positions led them to correctly deny the various monistic
jurisprudential theories on offer and to reembrace the
skepticism of the Legal Realists.188 To the extent that CLS
scholars were characterized by “the purity of their
negativism,”189 as one of their critics put it, it is because CLS
authors denied the optimistic premises of monism tout
court. There is no golden road to legal truth, and the
relentless application of reason cannot in the end yield
uniquely correct results in some cases. Theories that
suggest otherwise are nothing more than false hopes at best
and bad-faith apologias for an unjust status quo at worst.
On this point, the value pluralists and the CLS authors
agree: normative jurisprudence must come to grips with
indeterminacy and value pluralism. To continue on the
monist path is to remain legally and ethically tone-deaf,
hearing only one note or pitch when in fact there are many.
The jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin can serve as a
useful foil here, for his response to the problem of hard
186. See, e.g., DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 25; TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY, supra note 4; JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 141;
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993).
187. See generally Kennedy, The Critique of Rights in Critical Legal Studies,
supra note 14, at 178-228 (dismissing all attempts to find determinate
normative theory for the resolution of legal disputes).
188. Gordon, supra note 43, at 197 (“[W]e discovered a partly buried treasure,
the writings of the ‘Legal Realists, a group of legal scholars of the 1920s and
1930s who, like ourselves, devoted much intellectual energy to slaying their
fathers . . . .”).
189. Fiss, supra note 72, at 9.
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cases is precisely the opposite of the argument I am
advancing. Dworkin understood the claim of moderate legal
indeterminacy well, and he did not attempt to deny that, on
first impression, there are cases for which application of the
existing legal authorities and associated conventions fail to
yield a uniquely correct answer.190 But Dworkin argued that
the law contained more than just the surface-level doctrine
(rules and standards), but also contained deeper
principles.191 Principles, according to Dworkin, are moral
values embedded in the law, pitched at a higher level of
abstraction than operable doctrine.192 By correctly appealing
to principles and elaborating on them, a legal decisionmaker
(granted, a Hercules193) will be able to derive an operational
rule to determine the outcome of the case at hand.194 In
other words, by recognizing principles as part of the law
itself, by expanding the sources of legal authority beyond
those conventionally recognized, the
problem of
indeterminacy can be solved.195 With the principles of the
law to work with, a heroic judge can resolve all legal
disputes determinately.

190. DWORKIN, Hard Cases, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 4, at 81
[hereinafter DWORKIN, Hard Cases] (arguing that there is a right answer “even
when no settled rule disposes of the case”).
191. DWORKIN, The Model of Rules I, supra note 4, at 22-28.
192. Id. at 22-28 (describing the role of principles, as opposed to rules, in law).
193. DWORKIN, Hard Cases, supra note 190, at 105 (“I have invented . . . a
lawyer of superhuman skill, learning, patience and acumen, whom I shall call
Hercules.”).
194. Id. at 105-30 (describing how Hercules can decide hard cases). Dworkin’s
theory strikes me as an updated version of Langdellian formalism: From
existing rules, induce principles. Then deduce new rules from principles. Voila—
determinate rules!
195. What is unique about Dworkin’s view is not his appeal to values or
principles, but rather his insistence that the appeal to principles is still an
appeal to internal legal sources. See LEITER, A Note on Legal Indeterminacy,
supra note 23, at 11 (describing Dworkin’s view that “unpedigreed moral
principles” count as legal sources). Legal positivists, of course, criticize
Dworkin’s insistence that principles (values) without conventional legal
pedigree are legal sources themselves. See, e.g., HART, supra note 35, at 263-68.
Here, my criticism is directed against the monism of his account of values, not
its anti-positivism.
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Value pluralism denies that adding principles (values)
to the sources of law, even if legitimate, will make the law
globally determinate. The values to which the judge must
turn may themselves be multiple, conflicting, and
incommensurable. In sum, Dworkin’s appeal to principles
can only patch up the indeterminacy of conventional legal
reasoning if the principles are themselves ultimately
unitary or harmonious. And, indeed, Dworkin has argued
precisely that all values are ultimately commensurable and
harmonious in precisely the way Berlin denied.196 In short,
Dworkin has explicitly revealed himself as a monist about
values, and it is his value monism that allows him to work
up a theory of global legal determinacy. For Dworkin, cases
that appear to be indeterminate at first blush are all
revealed to have a uniquely correct answer by appealing to
values beyond the conventional sources of law.197 If value
pluralism is correct, however, then the appeal to values
cannot eviscerate indeterminacy because the relevant
values
are
themselves
plural,
conflicting,
and
incommensurable.198
D. A Brief Note on Discretion
Accepting moderate indeterminacy and value pluralism
also implies that in tragic cases judges have discretion to
choose among a range of legally and morally plausible
options. The debate over judicial discretion—whether it
legitimately exists or not—often comes up as part of larger
debates between legal realism and legal formalism or

196. RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 1 (2011) (“This book defends a
large and old philosophical thesis: the unity of value.”).
197. DWORKIN, The Model of Rules I, supra note 4, at 44 (“[I]f we treat
principles as law we must reject the positivists’ . . . second tenet – the doctrine
of judicial discretion . . . .”).
198. See HART, supra note 35, at 204 (“Judicial decision, especially on matters
of high constitutional import, often involves a choice between moral values, and
not merely the application of some single outstanding moral principle; for it is
folly to believe that where the meaning of the law is in doubt, morality always
has a clear answer to offer.”).
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between positivism and natural law theories.199 Those who
deny legal indeterminacy, such as Dworkin, usually argue
that because the law rationally determines one right
answer, the judge’s duty is to reason to that uniquely
correct answer.200 By recognizing that some legal cases are
both legally indeterminate and implicate incommensurable
values, I am committed to the view that legal
decisionmakers in such cases do, necessarily, have
discretion to choose among the resolutions that are legally
and ethically justifiable. That is to say, because judges in
tragic cases have multiple resolutions that are legally and
ethically justifiable, they necessarily have discretion among
those choices.201 To what extent there are better or worse
ways of exercising that discretion is the subject of the next
section.
IV. WHAT IS A LEGAL DECISIONMAKER TO DO WITH TRAGIC
CASES?
A. The Problem Restated
In this final section, I endeavor to face head-on the
question of how a legal decisionmaker should deal with
tragic cases. Assuming that a judge faces a question with no
uniquely correct answer as a matter of law or values, how is
she to go about choosing among the plausible answers? One
might take the view that there really is no problem at all;
assuming that the judge has diligently excised all
implausible answers—i.e., all answers precluded by law—
then any of the remaining choices are ipso facto plausible.
Indeed, the available options in a genuinely tragic case are
199. For a useful overview of debates regarding discretion, see Lucy, supra
note 83, at 215-21.
200. In theory, of course, one could be a global determinist with respect to law,
but have a view of adjudication that allows for deviation from the rationally
determined answer. For instance, jurists who insist that sometimes judges must
do what is just despite what the law requires would fit into this category.
201. This is “strong discretion” in Eric Miller’s terms. Miller, Judicial
Preference, supra note 176, at 1287. In a tragic case, the judge has discretion
among plausible options and “[r]eason fails to provide a determinate outcome to
the legal problem.” Id.
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all rational in the sense that one can arrive at each option
through rational application of the available legal sources or
values to the case at hand.202 If rational justification
requires only that the final choice be rational in this sense,
then the decisionmaker cannot go wrong in choosing any of
the tragic options.
Joseph Raz suggests as much when he writes that
rational action is “not action for a reason that defeats all
those which conflict with it;”203 rather, “[r]ational action is
action for a reason that is reasonably thought to be
undefeated.”204 In other words, one can be said to be acting
(or choosing to act) rationally even when there are still
other options that would themselves be rational actions
available. The test for rational action is not that one’s choice
is the uniquely correct one, for there may be others; the test
is whether one’s own choice is rational on its own terms,
whether it has been precluded by reasons or not. For Raz,
this
explains
precisely
why
choices
between
incommensurable goods can still be rational choices.205
But, of course, the sting of tragic cases in law is that one
feels let down by the decisionmaker if he or she gives up on
giving reasons as soon as she has narrowed the choices to
those that are plausible or rational in the Raz-ian sense.
Raz, too, understands that when it comes to legal decisions
his defense of rational action in the face of
incommensurable choices does not end the matter.206 The
problem, as Raz puts it, “arises not from a difficulty of
squaring incommensurability of reasons with a theory of
rational action or rational choice, but from a principle of
political morality, namely the principle of the public
accountability of public actions.”207 This principle of public
202. Raz calls these undefeated reasons. See JOSEPH RAZ, BETWEEN AUTHORITY
ON THE THEORY OF LAW AND PRACTICAL REASON 368 (2009)
[hereinafter RAZ, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION].

AND INTERPRETATION:

203. Id. (emphasis added).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 368-69.
207. Id. at 368.
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accountability means that judges and other public officials
must do more than simply eliminate irrational options when
making public decisions; they need to make sure that their
decisions among rational choices are not personal, arbitrary,
or idiosyncratic.208 While it may be perfectly legitimate for a
private person facing a choice between incommensurable
goods to ultimately choose one over the other on the basis of
“non-rational dispositions or tastes,” public decisionmakers
in their public capacities must not do this.209
Raz clearly grasps that his account of rational
decisionmaking in the light of incommensurable choices still
leaves judges facing such choices with a “problem.”210 Raz
then turns back to conventional legal doctrine as a way for
judges to choose among incommensurable choices; he
suggests,
in
other
words,
that
judges
facing
incommensurable choices can rely on “formal legal
reasoning” as a non-arbitrary, rational method to get them
to a single best answer.211 But, of course, as he admits, this
suggestion will be of no help where the conventions of the
law are themselves indeterminate with respect to the
dispute.212 For a truly tragic case, one which we already
know is legally indeterminate, formal legal reasoning
cannot possibly provide a method to choose among the final
incommensurable alternatives. So while Raz, correctly in
my view, can provide legal decisionmakers with some
comfort that they may still act rationally even when faced
with incommensurable choices because either choice is
rational, he cannot provide us with any way to decide
among incommensurable choices in tragic cases on
something other than arbitrary, idiosyncratic acts of will.213
And because judges are public officials rendering public

208. Id. at 369.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 368.
211. Id. at 369.
212. Id.
213. For an attempt to provide alternative procedures and tie-breaking rules
in tragic cases, see Miller, Permissive Justification, supra note 180, at 44.
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decisions, we would like them to do better than arbitrary
and idiosyncratic.214
I am not interested in the public relations questions of
how the judge should sell his or her decision in the
articulation of the opinion or in some other fashion. The
discomfort I am expressing here is not a fear that the
litigants or larger society will not accept a legal decision
that appears arbitrary, though that is a legitimate fear.
Here, my interest is in exploring what a conscientious judge
ought to do once he or she recognizes that he or she faces a
tragic case. In a tragic case, recall, the law allows for
multiple rational determinations, and the legally legitimate
choices implicate conflicting and incommensurable values.
This does not mean that all answers are open to the judge; a
careful parsing of both the law and values will eliminate
many wrong answers, answers that are precluded because
conventional legal analysis does not permit them or because
superior ethical choices are available. In a tragic case, then,
even though the law and values cannot identify a uniquely
correct answer, the law and values can and will constrain
the choice, whittling down the options to a finite few. The
conscientious judge’s usual modes of decisionmaking will be
appropriate up to this point.215 It is the final choice among
conflicting yet legally and ethically plausible resolutions
that is not amenable to the conventional decisionmaking
process.
B. Practical Wisdom and Its Limits
It is at this point, when the tragic choice between
incommensurable goods can no longer be avoided and the
judge can no longer rely on any outcome-determinative
logic, that practical wisdom and the virtue ethics tradition
enter the picture.216 Practical wisdom—also called phronesis,
214. Id. at 45.
215. Of course, the conventional methods of legal decisionmaking in easy cases
may themselves be subject to extra-legal normative criticism, but that
discussion is beyond the scope of this article.
216. For over a decade, Lawrence Solum has been at the intellectual forefront
of the virtue ethics movement in normative jurisprudence. See, e.g., COLIN
FARRELLY & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, An Introduction to Aretaic Theories of Law, in
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or prudence—is a concept with a long pedigree going back to
Plato and Aristotle.217 Like many venerable ethical concepts,
it has taken on a variety of meanings over the centuries, but
at its heart, practical wisdom is the virtue associated with
thinking practically about specific choices, as opposed to
thinking universally or theoretically.218 Practical wisdom is
the faculty that allows its bearer to make wise decisions
about how to act in specific circumstances.219 But it is not
simple means-ends rationality or tactical skill.220 Practical
wisdom includes not only the ability to reason teleologically
and with rational rigor but also the ability to deliberate
about ends.221 As a type of knowledge, it stands in contrast
to theoretical wisdom (or sophia), the virtue associated with
thinking about universals and necessary truths.222 The
distinction between practical wisdom and theoretical
wisdom does not suggest that the two are incompatible; to
the contrary, acting with practical wisdom will often require
a minimum of theoretical wisdom, and gaining worthwhile

VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE 1 (Colin Farrelly & Lawrence B. Solum eds., 2008);
Lawrence B. Solum, The Aretaic Turn in Constitutional Theory, 70 BROOK. L.
REV. 475, 510-11 (2004-05) [hereinafter Solum, The Aretaic Turn in
Constitutional Theory]; Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A VirtueCentred Theory of Judging, 34 METAPHILOSOPHY 178 (2003) [hereinafter Solum,
A Virtue-Centred Theory of Judging]; Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence:
Towards an Aretaic Theory of Law, in ARISTOTLE AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW:
THEORY, PRACTICE AND JUSTICE (Liesbeth Huppes-Cluysenaer et al. eds., 2013)
[hereinafter Solum, Towards an Aretaic Theory of Law].
217. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. VI (L.H.G. Greenwood trans.,
Arno Press 1973) (describing virtue of practical wisdom); PLATO, THE REPUBLIC,
bk. IV (Francis MacDonald Cornford trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1961). For a
recent popular exposition of the concept, see BARRY SCHWARTZ & KENNETH
SHARPE, PRACTICAL WISDOM: THE RIGHT WAY TO DO THE RIGHT THING (2010).
218. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 217.
219. Solum, A Virtue-Centred Theory of Judging, supra note 216, at 192
(“Practical wisdom is the virtue that enables one to make good choices in
particular circumstances.”).
220. See HENRY S. RICHARDSON, PRACTICAL REASONING ABOUT FINAL ENDS
(1994).
221. Id. at 3-6.
222. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 217.
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theoretical wisdom will often require practical wisdom.223
Rather, the function of the two types of wisdom are
different; phronesis is concerned with deliberating correctly
about how to act, while sophia is concerned with thinking
correctly about what is true.
Practical wisdom is not a phrase Berlin elucidated
explicitly in the context of discussing tragic choices. But a
holistic reading of his work reveals that he was not only
familiar with the concept but gave it considerable attention.
Berlin consistently stressed the importance of the “concrete
situation” in judging right action in personal and communal
life.224 In his essay On Political Judgment, Berlin explicitly
contrasts the “good judgment” of a statesman with the
empirical knowledge or deductive logic of a scientist.225
“Obviously,” he wrote, “what matters is to understand a
particular situation in its full uniqueness, the particular
men and events and dangers . . . in a particular place at a
particular time.”226 Berlin explained that good judgment
(phronesis) must draw upon scientific knowledge (sophia) to
reach successful decisions but that people with good
judgment are not necessarily any better about thinking “in
general terms” than others; “[t]heir merit is that they grasp
the unique combination of characteristics that constitute
this particular situation—this and no other.”227 What people

223. Isaiah Berlin, On Political Judgment, NEW YORK REV. OF BOOKS, Oct. 3,
1996, at 26, 30 [hereinafter Berlin, On Political Judgment] (“Botany helps
gardeners, laws of dietetics may help cooks . . . .”).
224. Berlin, On the Pursuit of the Ideal, supra note 1, at 18 (“The concrete
situation is almost everything.”).
225. Berlin, On Political Judgment, supra note 223, at 30; see also Lawrence
B. Solum, Towards an Aretaic Theory of Law, supra note 216, at 24 (“[P]ractical
wisdom or phronêsis—think of the quality that we describe as ‘good judgment’ or
‘common sense.’”).
226. Berlin, On Political Judgment, supra note 223, at 27. Berlin is writing
here about political judgment, rather than judicial judgment, but that
distinction is not crucial in this context.
227. Id.; see also Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, The Venn Diagram of Business
Lawyering Judgments: Toward a Theory of Practical Metadisciplinarity, 41
SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 3 (2011) (defining phronesis as “the ability to deliberate
well, to deal with universal principles as well as particular actions, to assess
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who possess practical wisdom have, in other words, is some
“exceptional sensitiveness to certain kinds of fact . . . an
acute sense of what fits with what, what springs from what,
what leads to what . . . a sense for what is qualitative rather
than quantitative . . . for synthesis rather than analysis.”228
Berlin’s description of good judgment can sound a bit
mystical,229 and the very context-specificity that Berlin
emphasizes makes it difficult to package practical reason
into anything like an operational methodology.230
Nevertheless, the discussion of practical wisdom bears on
the question of how to approach tragic cases, for it confirms
that the way forward for a judge who has recognized a
tragic case does not lie in further theoretical knowledge
(sophia). No rational refinement or clever calculation will
deliver to the legal decisionmaker the uniquely correct
answer in a tragic case. Still, there are certain
decisionmaking virtues that a conscientious judge can
cultivate in hopes of making wiser, if not provably better,
decisions when he has the discretion to do so. Among those
traits are (1) relevant experience; (2) sensitivity to the full
panoply of facts and values implicated by a case; and (3) a
deep sense of humility.
Theorists of practical wisdom stress that, because it is a
virtue or disposition,231 practical wisdom must be cultivated
which actions are conducive to ends, to employ sympathetic understanding in
the effort to determine what is fair, and to distinguish and abjure mere
cleverness in the pursuit of a bad end”).
228. Berlin, On Political Judgment, supra note 223, at 27-28.
229. Berlin himself was at pains to say that his concept of good judgment was
sometimes called “misleadingly, intuition (which dangerously suggests some
almost magical faculty).” Id. at 28.
230. Indeed, one of the key insights of the practical wisdom tradition is its
insistence that not all significant knowledge is explicit or articulable; much
important knowledge is tacit and resists formulation. See, e.g., Brett G. Scharffs,
Law as Craft, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2245, 2286 (2001) [hereinafter Scharffs, Law as
Craft].
231. See Anthony T. Kronman, Alexander Bickel’s Philosophy of Prudence, 94
YALE L.J. 1567, 1569 (1985) [hereinafter Kronman, Alexander Bickel’s
Philosophy of Prudence] (“The most important element in Bickel’s political
philosophy, and the key to understanding his work as a whole, is his belief in
the value of prudence as a political and judicial virtue. By prudence I mean a
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through experience.232 It is not a piece of information or a
rule or an operation that can be articulated and transmitted
directly from one person to another. It cannot be taught or
learned in the way we teach or learn facts or rules. At best,
practical wisdom can be identified and modeled by others,
but it is not something one memorizes or grasps all of a
sudden.233 It requires more-or-less conscious cultivation
through practice. Berlin analogized good judgment to the
“semi-instinctive skill” of a doctor or race-car driver; it
improves imperceptibly with constant practice, it manifests
itself only in particular circumstances and choices, and it
cannot be reduced to abstract explanation.234 For judges
confronting tragic cases, this suggests that while there is no
pre-packaged formula they can apply, personal experience
with legal decisionmaking, and with tragic cases in
particular, might make them better at dealing with such
cases in the future.235 At a minimum, relevant experience
trait or characteristic that is at once an intellectual capacity and a
temperamental disposition.”).
232. See Laurie Morin & Louise Howells, The Reflective Judgment Project, 9
CLINICAL L. REV. 623, 678 (2003) (“Notions of practical wisdom and creative
problem solving by their very nature depend upon life experience.”).
233. Solum, The Aretaic Turn in Constitutional Theory, supra note 216, at 498
(explaining that “programs of judicial education should aim to cultivate these
virtues in those who are already judges.”).
234. See Berlin, On Political Judgment, supra note 223, at 27.
235. Justice Benjamin Cardozo stressed both the value of judicial experience
and the similarity between judicial and legislative virtue:
If you ask how he [the judge] is to know when one interest outweighs
another, I can only answer that he must get his knowledge just as [a]
legislator gets it, from experience and study and reflection; in brief,
from life itself. Here, indeed, is the point of contact between the
legislator’s work and his. The choice of methods, the appraisement of
values, must in the end be guided by like considerations for the one as
for the other. Each indeed is legislating within the limits of his
competence. No doubt the limits for the judge are narrower. He
legislates only between gaps. He fills the open spaces in the law. How
far he [the judge] may go without traveling beyond the walls of the
interstices cannot be staked out for him upon a chart. He must learn it
for himself as he gains the sense of fitness and proportion that comes
with years of habitude in the practice of an art.
Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, in SELECTED WRITINGS
107, 154 (Margaret E. Hall ed., 1947).
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should not be ignored. Experience is an asset. As Holmes
once put it in a different context, “[t]he life of the law has
not been logic: it has been experience.”236
What experiences of the right sort might make possible
is a kind of extraordinary sensitivity characteristic of good
judgment—a flexible capacity to take in and synthesize all
relevant facts, identify values at stake, and recognize the
implications of choosing among different options. A judge
who is attuned only to legally relevant facts, legally
relevant authorities, and legitimate modes of legal
reasoning may have all the skills she needs to resolve easy
cases correctly. But such a judge does not have the proper
disposition to resolve tragic cases, for she will fail to sense
the full set of facts and values at stake. The practically wise
judge will be able to imagine how each potential choice of
resolving the case would honor some values and undermine
others and how all the people affected by the decision would
view the decision and be impacted by it. This demands of
legal decisionmakers in tragic cases both empathy—an
ability to see the world through the eyes of others237—and
something we might call predictive imagination—an ability
to imagine how different potential decisions would actually
turn out.238 These abilities to make educated guesses are
themselves not susceptible to formulaic articulation, but
nevertheless, we can say that some people have them
comparatively more than others and that they are skills
worth cultivating.
To be sure, the kind of sensitivity that the practically
wise judge has is not any kind of scientific ability to choose
the very best possible outcome. Tragic cases are not
amenable to that kind of scientific predictability or
consequentialist resolution. Rather, sensitivity suggests a
capacity to imagine the full panoply of potential real-world
236. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
237. Solum, The Aretaic Turn in Constitutional Theory, supra note 216, at 51516 (“Judges should be partial to none, but should possess an appropriate degree
of sympathy and empathy with all who appear before them.”).
238. See Berlin, On Political Judgment, supra note 223, at 28 (“Above all this
[good judgment] is an acute sense of what fits with what, what springs from
what, what leads to what . . . .”).
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impacts of the different choices available. Such exploration
cannot on its own determine the outcome of the case, but it
can illuminate what is really at stake and what is not. A
sensitive legal decisionmaker can deliberate, for instance,
on which possible outcomes might be more endurable than
others or which context-specific factors might tilt in one
direction or the other.239 A judge with a fine sense of his or
her own polity’s history and social forces might be able to
discern which available option would cohere best with the
particular institutional and cultural context in which he or
she makes the decision and which option best reflects the
particular ethos of the polity.240
Finally, practical wisdom implies humility with respect
to one’s own ability to reach correct decisions and alter realworld outcomes.241 Humility in this sense is not about
paying obeisance to some other person or authority, nor is it
a pose to garner more empathy or understanding. As part of
the decisionmaking process, humility is “consciousness of
one’s own limits in solving a problem.”242 In tragic cases,
recall, the problem is a surfeit of legitimate answers and a
lack of a uniquely correct answer. Any decisionmaker who
believes that he or she knows the one right answer to a
tragic case is not just arrogant; he or she is wrong. There is
no single resolution that the law or moral values requires. A
decisionmaker who recognizes that reality cannot help but
evince some humility about his or her own choice, and he or
she will also be humble in criticizing other decisionmakers
239. Cf. Singer, supra note 11, at 62 (“Everyone has had the experience of
making important, difficult moral decisions. And almost no one does it by
applying a formula . . . . They do think long and hard about what they want in
life; they imagine what their lives would be like if they were to follow one path
rather than another . . . .”).
240. The use of coherence here is not meant to suggest a necessary or objective
criterion of choice among incommensurable options. It may be that two
practically wise judges can come to different conclusions about which option
coheres best with social ethos.
241. Judicial decisions do not always have the real-world effects judges expect
them to have.
242. Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court, 2010 Term—Foreword: Neutral
Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems For Constitutional Law,
125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 62, n.347 (2011).
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who come to different but legitimate choices. Dan Kahan
employs the term aporia to describe a style of expression
whose “distinctive feature is acknowledgment of complexity”
and “the limited amenability of [a] problem to a satisfactory
solution, along with apprehension of the same.”243 While
Kahan’s use of the term relates specifically to the rhetoric of
legal opinions, the “aporetic engagement” he describes
dovetails nicely with the kind of humility characteristic of
practical wisdom. Rather than assume a “posture of
unqualified, untroubled confidence,”244 the aporetic or
humble judge cannot help but have doubts about his or her
final decision in a tragic case, for the nature of the case
makes it impossible to have any “untroubled confidence”
that the judge has picked out the one right answer.245 The
humble judge facing a tragic case would recognize the
inability of conventional legal analysis to decisively resolve
the case, the plurality and incommensurability of the
ultimate values at stake, and the resulting multiplicity of
legitimate legal answers. He would also recognize that his
best guesses about what effect his decision will actually
have on individuals and social values may be wrong. In a
complex world, there is never a simple line between a
judicial or policy decision and a particular outcome.
An emphasis on practical wisdom and its constellation
of virtues would doubtless be a salutary step in thinking
about tragic cases. Legal decisionmakers would do well to
draw upon relevant experience, evince sensitivity to all
relevant factors, endeavor to imagine alternate futures, and
maintain humility in the face of tragic cases. Nevertheless,
recognizing practical wisdom as a virtue, perhaps the
master virtue of judging in tragic cases,246 does not mean
243. Id. at 62 & n.347.
244. Dan Kahan, The Aporetic Judge, CULTURAL COGNITION PROJECT (Oct. 2,
2012, 11:49 PM), http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2012/10/2/the-aporeticjudge.html.
245. Id.
246. One might go so far as to call practical wisdom the master virtue of
judging simpliciter. It is no surprise that some of our most respected judges—
e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Benjamin Cardozo, and Henry Friendly—are
best known for their practical wisdom, not for their technical legal acumen.
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that it can be packaged into an operable decisionmaking
procedure or evaluative criteria. To the contrary, practical
wisdom is a trait that we may be able to recognize and
demonstrate without being able to abstract it from the
particular decisions in which it manifests itself.247 To
paraphrase the old Justice Potter Stewart quote, we might
know it when we see it, but we have a hard time defining
the necessary and sufficient conditions of good judgment.248
Moreover, intellectual understanding of practical wisdom is
not the same as acting with practical wisdom, just as
intellectual understanding of how to operate a car is not the
same thing as driving well.249 Practical wisdom is thus, at
the same time, both an answer to the question of how to
approach tragic cases and no answer at all. It correctly
points us away from the rationalist (and monist) faith that
the application of reason to legal problems will always yield
a single right answer, and it correctly points us toward
dispositions that allow for reflection and deliberation about
a multiplicity of plausible choices. But practical wisdom
cannot be bottled and passed out to legal decisionmakers to
take in before deciding tragic cases, nor can it be
generalized and rendered operable like a legal rule or even
a rule of thumb. Indeed, one of its central lessons is to
respect the particular circumstances of each unique case
247. Anthony Kronman, even while promoting what he called “a philosophy of
prudence” admitted that prudence is a “capacity that is at once so ordinary and
ineffable and seemingly resistant to analysis.” Kronman, Alexander Bickel’s
Philosophy of Prudence, supra note 231, at 1615.
248. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
Justice Stewart’s reliance on his own eyes, rather than on any particular
definition of obscenity, might itself be considered a rare instance of practical
wisdom in First Amendment jurisprudence.
249. Berlin put the point colorfully thus:
If I am driving a car in desperate haste, and come to a rickety-looking
bridge, and must make up my mind whether it will bear my weight,
some knowledge of the principles of engineering would no doubt be
useful. But even so I can scarcely afford to stop to survey and calculate.
To be useful to me in a crisis such knowledge must have given rise to a
semi-instinctive skill—like the ability to read without simultaneous
awareness of the rules of the language.
Berlin, On Political Judgment, supra note 223, at 27.
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and resist the impulse to quickly categorize and generalize
so as to render the case amenable to abstract rules.
C. Balancing, Compromise, and Enduring Conflict
In his essay On the Pursuit of the Ideal, Berlin posed
the question directly: if ultimate values clash, and reason
cannot yield a uniquely correct answer to burning social
questions:
[A]s Chernyshevsky and Lenin once asked, “What is to be done?”
How do we choose between possibilities? What and how much
must we sacrifice to what? There is, it seems to me, no clear reply.
But the collisions, even if they cannot be avoided, can be softened.
Claims can be balanced, compromises can be reached: in concrete
situations not every claim is of equal force—so much liberty and
so much equality; so much for sharp moral condemnation, and so
much for understanding a given human situation; so much for the
full force of the law, and so much for the prerogative of mercy . . . .
Priorities, never final and absolute, must be established. . . .
So we must engage in what are called tradeoffs—rules, values,
principles must yield to each other in varying degrees in specific
situations. . . . The best that can be done, as a general rule, is to
maintain a precarious equilibrium that will prevent the
occurrence of desperate situations, of intolerable choices—that is
the first requirement for a decent society . . . . A certain humility
in these matters is very necessary.250

Berlin seemed to recognize that this response would not
satisfy many who yearn for a more certain or inspiring
answer. “A little dull, as a solution, you will say? . . . Yet if
there is some truth in this view, perhaps that is
sufficient.”251
Berlin’s answer to the question “What is to be done?”
alludes, of course, to the virtues and dispositions of practical
wisdom discussed above.252 To recognize and internalize that
there is “no clear reply” is the essence of the humility that

250. Berlin, On the Pursuit of the Ideal, supra note 1, at 16, 18.
251. Id. at 18.
252. See discussion supra notes 230-44 and accompanying text (discussing
humility and fact-sensitivity).
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he deemed “very necessary” in these matters.253 And there is
the characteristic focus on the “concrete situation,”
demanding an acute sensitivity to all relevant facts and
values implicated by the specific case at hand.254 The part of
Berlin’s answer that is more surprising is his suggestion
that balancing and compromise are possible and that some
“equilibrium”
might
be
established
between
incommensurable values.255 These suggestions appear in
significant tension with the whole thrust of Berlin’s thought
on incommensurability, which held that because diverse
values lack a common scale, there is no way to balance them
against one another, as one can balance, say, a sack of coins
and a bag of sugar on a balance scale.256 If equality and
liberty are truly incommensurable and truly clash, then in
what sense can the clash be balanced or settled in a
compromise? How is a policymaker or judge to know that
“so much liberty and so much equality”257 and no more or no
less is the right balance? Berlin did not, of course, provide
any formula or guidance.
One can understand how a purely pragmatic mutual
compromise between disputants could be achieved—an
outcome in which both parties to a dispute receive less than
253. Berlin, On the Pursuit of the Ideal, supra note 1, at 16, 18.
254. Id. at 18.
255. See id. As Duncan Kennedy has perceptively pointed out, explicit
balancing has become pervasive in our legal system largely because both sides
in many disputes have plausible legal and rights-based claims. Kennedy, The
Critique of Rights in Critical Legal Studies, supra note 14, at 197-98 (“Rights
Argument within Legal Reasoning Reduces to Balancing and Therefore to
Policy.”). Judges often respond to such tragic cases by self-consciously trying to
balance the rights and interests asserted on each side against one another.
Kennedy writes that the “balancing depends on the practical context and on
nonrights arguments about things like the degree of harm that will flow from
different resolutions of the conflict.” Id. at 210. For Kennedy, this shows that
rights rhetoric ultimately collapses into ordinary policy rhetoric. Id. at 197-98. I
would add only that a clash of legal and moral rights is just a particular type of
tragic case, unamenable to determinate legal or ethical resolution.
256. On the inappropriate use of “balancing” as a metaphor in judicial
decisionmaking, see Scharffs, Adjudication and the Problems of
Incommensurability, supra note 163, at 1416-17.
257. Berlin, On the Pursuit of the Ideal, supra note 1, at 18.

592

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

everything they want, but more than nothing. Such
compromise might in some cases “soften” the collision
between the litigants and between the values at stake, and
thus serve the value of peaceful coexistence.258 But
compromises cannot eliminate the clash of ultimate values;
in a compromise, some values are given short shrift while
others are honored. The imperative of peaceful coexistence
cannot always tell us which of multiple compromises strikes
a better “balance” between clashing values. As Berlin
acknowledges, “[p]riorities, never final and absolute, must
be established.”259 But how to establish such priorities, even
temporarily, remains nebulous.
Berlin’s resort to the language of balancing and
equilibrium, I submit, is not meant to suggest anything like
a literal weighing of values against one another—impossible
given incommensurability—but rather to indicate that all
ultimate values must be paid some minimum level of
respect within each case and within society as a whole.
While the values of equality and liberty, for instance, do
clash and are incommensurable, neither value should ever
wholly vanquish the other; hence, particular prioritizations
of those values in any particular dispute are “never final
and absolute.”260 Thus, a compromise leaving both values
partially intact is better than a resolution in which one
value wins out decisively, for a total lack of one value or the
other is simply inhuman.261 On a larger scale, Berlin
suggested, a society or legal system which always
prioritized one value over another would be making a grave
error, even though one cannot say with any confidence in
any particular case which value should be prioritized.262 The
258. See id. at 16, 18 (“[T]he collisions, even if they cannot be avoided, can be
softened.”).
259. Id. at 18.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 15 (“[T]otal liberty for wolves is death to the lambs, total liberty of
the powerful, the gifted, is not compatible with the rights to a decent existence
of the weak and the less gifted.”).
262. Id. at 18 (“The best that can be done, as a general rule, is to maintain a
precarious equilibrium that will prevent the occurrence of desperate situations,
of intolerable choices—that is the first requirement for a decent society . . . .”).
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upshot of this view is that judges in any particular tragic
case ought to be aware of the larger allocation of values in
society, taking care that their own decisions will not overlymarginalize any ultimate value.
Here, a brief example from the field of criminal
procedure may help elucidate the point. In the law of postconviction review, the values of accuracy and finality are
both legitimate and often clash.263 We want a system that
allows gross miscarriages of justice to be corrected even
after a conviction (accuracy), and we also want a system
that can decisively dispose of criminal cases (finality). Seen
in its best light, our highly complicated and multi-tiered
system of post-conviction review tries to honor both of these
values, but inevitably in any particular case in which a
judge must interpret open-textured law either in favor of
accuracy or in favor of finality, one of the two values must
be sacrificed. There is no one right way to balance the
values, for they are incommensurable, but we can strive for
some sensible overall equilibrium between the two values. A
society which sought to achieve only accuracy without ever
honoring finality—or one which sought only finality without
ever honoring accuracy—would be a morally deformed
society. That insight cannot, of course, determine the
answer to any particular tragic case in post-conviction
review pitting one value against the other, but it can at
least caution a judge to take both values into account and
not to wholly slight one value or the other. It is not that
judges can turn the dials and somehow reach a fine-tuned
equilibrium between the two values; incommensurability
makes such fine-tuning impossible. But judges can and
should recognize the valid claims of both values and seek to
ensure that both values remain vital within the
institutional system of post-conviction review.
On the view I am describing, the clash between values
that manifests itself in any particular tragic case should be
seen as enduring and necessary, even by the decisionmaker
who must make a choice between values. The insolubility of
tragic cases is not, then, a defect in our legal system, but
263. See David Wolitz, Innocence Commissions and the Future of PostConviction Review, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 1027, 1054 (2010).
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rather a reflection of the system’s deepest humanity. “These
collisions of values,” Berlin wrote, “are of the essence of
what they are and what we are.”264 It is, for us,
inconceivable that our legal system could resolve these
collisions once and for all, for the conflict of ultimate values
is a necessarily enduring feature of the values themselves
and our human attempt to adhere to them.265 Christopher
Kutz, drawing on Berlin’s pluralism, argued that
“ineradicable conflict and divergence in a complex legal
system is not a sign that things have gone awry, but that
things are going well, that the legal regime is taking
seriously plural claims of value.”266 For Kutz, it is
convergence or unanimity, not divergence, that is “a sign of
dysfunction” in a legal system, “[j]ust as a life that revealed
no regret about difficult choices” would be a sign of moral
atrophy in an individual.267 On a systemic level, then, the
conflict generated by tragic cases and the legal
decisionmaker’s struggle to resolve such cases can be seen
as a healthy, appropriate, and necessary component of a
legal regime’s commitment to the multiple and
incommensurable ends of human life.268

264. Berlin, On the Pursuit of the Ideal, supra note 1, at 15.
265. Id. (“If we are told that these contradictions will be solved in some perfect
world in which all good things can be harmonized in principle, then we must
answer, to those who say this, that the meanings they attach to the names,
which for us denote the conflicting values, are not ours. We must say that the
world in which what we see as incompatible values are not in conflict is a world
altogether beyond our ken . . . .”).
266. Christopher L. Kutz, Note, Just Disagreement: Indeterminacy and
Rationality in the Rule of Law, 103 YALE L.J. 997, 1028 (1994).
267. Id. at 1029.
268. As Kutz reminds us, “Heraclitus wrote that justice is strife[.]” Id. In a
similar vein, John Alder wrote that, in tragic cases, “dissents may be no less
important than concurring speeches fulfilling as they do the role of drawing
public attention to incommensurable values and keeping alive choices for the
future.” John Adler, Dissents in Courts of Last Resort: Tragic Choices?, 20
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 221, 224 (2000).
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D. Liberation or Despair
When we turn back to the individual case, however,
systemic optimism about tragic cases is not of much
consolation. After all, the legal decisionmaker still faces the
choice of abjuring one party’s legitimate claim and causing
the diminution of an important value, no matter which
resolution she chooses. When facing tragic choices, the
judge is, as Berlin said we all are, “doomed to choose, and
every choice may entail an irreparable loss.”269 Recognizing
this situation, a decisionmaker may then reasonably adopt
or fall into one of two very different attitudes which we
might call in shorthand: (1) liberation or (2) despair. A judge
who takes the first attitude will emphasize the plausibility
of the choices available to her. After all, a decision for either
party can be justified as consistent with legal authority and
with ultimate values, and either holding is therefore
rational in the Raz-ian sense.270 The risk for the liberated
judge is that, feeling uninhibited, she may be emboldened to
turn to personal preferences or idiosyncratic tastes or gut
feelings to choose among the available choices.271 She may
feel that here (finally!) she can exercise some creativity or
imagination. Even a scrupulous judge steeped in the
tradition of practical wisdom and appropriately on guard
against her own arbitrary proclivities may feel liberated
when facing a tragic case. Drawing on the tradition of
practical wisdom, such a judge might humbly rely on her
experience, endeavor to take all factors into consideration,
and do her best to discern the most prudent choice among
the plausible alternatives. Then, having made the decision,
the liberated judge will be done with the matter and rest
269. Berlin, On the Pursuit of the Ideal, supra note 1, at 15.
270. See RAZ, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION, supra note 202, at
368 (defining rational action not as action for “a reason that defeats all those
which conflict with it” but rather as “action for a reason that is reasonably
thought to be undefeated.”) (emphasis added).
271. For a sophistical defense of the legitimacy of personal preference in
deciding some cases, see Miller, Judicial Preference, supra note 176, at 1335
(“Where legal rules conflict, it is sometimes the case that no tie-breaking rule
resolves that conflict. In such circumstances, the judge must rely upon personal
preference to choose among the available outcomes.”).
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easy, knowing that her choice was both legally defensible
and the product of a sincere attempt to get it right.
On the other hand, the judge of despair is laid low by
the tragic case. He takes the path of law and logic as far as
they will go and then, bereft of any objectively demonstrable
reason to choose one plausible alternative over another, he
is at a psychological loss. He detests such cases, for, despite
having proper confidence in his legal acumen, he has no
confidence in his ability to choose well without legal
standards or decisive ethical imperatives to guide him. He
worries that he simply lacks the practical wisdom necessary
for this choice. Moreover, he cannot “get over” the loss his
decision will inevitably inflict on one value or another and
on one litigant or another. Even after he renders a decision,
he regrets how he ruled, he worries that one party and
value suffered an unjustifiable loss on his account, a loss
incommensurable with the gain afforded to the other party
and other value(s).
In the face of tragic cases, both attitudes are plausible,
and some mixture of the two attitudes is almost certainly
appropriate. I sketched the two archetypal dispositions so
as to locate the poles on a spectrum; neither pole is an ideal,
nor is it likely that many judges sit on either extreme end of
the spectrum. Most legal decisionmakers likely fall
somewhere in the middle of the spectrum, sometimes more
and sometimes less bothered by the phenomenon of tragic
cases. We want our judges to struggle seriously with tragic
cases, to take care to identify the values at stake, and to
deliberate with sensitivity and humility. But, having
reflected with sufficient care, we want our judges to have
the fortitude to make the hard calls that they cannot avoid
and then move on to the next legal dispute calling out for
resolution. We would rightly criticize both the judge who
decides tragic cases too cavalierly and the judge who cannot
bring himself to decide tragic cases at all.272

272. For an argument that recognizing the incommensurability of values
might lead to more cavalier legal decisionmaking than is optimal, see Schauer,
Instrumental Commensurability, supra note 16.
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CONCLUSION
The philosopher and rhetorician Chaïm Perelman wrote
that legitimate disagreement cannot exist where there is
only one right answer or where every answer is as good as
another.273 It is only where individuals can choose among a
finite range of plausible choices that legitimate
disagreement is possible.274 Perelman went further and
suggested that free moral decisionmaking (and evaluation)
is itself restricted to those realms in which a limited variety
of reasonable choices exist.275 There is no freedom, he
argued, where logic dictates a single correct answer, for
then any choice other than the right one is simply an
error.276 And if there are infinite rational choices, then any
whimsy will do; there is no moral weight attached to
choosing.277 We act with moral freedom and responsibility
only when multiple moral options are available, but the
options are not infinite. Seen in this Perelman-ian light,
tragic cases in the law are simply occasions for judges to act
with moral freedom—and bear all of freedom’s attendant
responsibility and anxiety.278
Our reaction to the recognition of tragic cases, then, will
mirror our larger reactions to the demands of moral freedom
in our collective and personal lives. If liberation and despair
273. CHAÏM PERELMAN, What the Philosopher May Learn From the Study of
Law, in JUSTICE, LAW, AND ARGUMENT: ESSAYS ON MORAL AND LEGAL REASONING
163, 165-66 (1980).
274. Id.
275. Id. at 172 (“What is a question of decision cannot be a question of truth.
One must yield to truth; there is no room for deciding.”); cf. LEARNED HAND, The
Spirit of Liberty (1944), in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 189, 190 (Irving Dilliard ed.,
3d ed. 1960) (“[T]he spirit of liberty is the spirit which is not too sure that it is
right . . . .”).
276. PERELMAN, supra note 273, at 172.
277. Id. at 166 (“[N]either the legislator nor the judge makes purely arbitrary
decisions . . . .”).
278. Indeed, Perelman suggested that the skill of lawyers and judges was
precisely their ability to make arguments in an arena in which a range of
answers is rationally plausible but no single answer is logically dictated. Id. at
167 (“The traditional role of law is to organize effectively and in various ways
the dialectics of imperfect human will and human reason.”).
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are the poles of attitudinal reaction, then Berlin is making
the case for a tragic sensibility somewhere along the
spectrum. We should never fool ourselves that a final
solution in which all ultimate values are realized and
harmonized is possible.279 Loss of value, irreparable loss, is
an inevitable feature of collective and personal
decisionmaking and cannot be rationalized or wished away.
Nevertheless, making such decisions lies at the core of what
it is to live life as a human being, and avoiding such
decisions is neither possible nor desirable.280 Recognizing
the inevitability of irredeemable loss, the best we can do as
human beings and as legal decisionmakers destined to face
tragic choices is to cultivate practical wisdom and strive for
some sensible equilibrium of ultimate human values.

279. As Berlin put it:
[T]he very notion of a final solution is not only impracticable but, if I
am right, and some values cannot but clash, incoherent also. The
possibility of a final solution—even if we forget the terrible sense that
these words acquired in Hitler’s day—turns out to be an illusion; and a
very dangerous one.
Berlin, Pursuit of the Ideal, supra note 1, at 16.
280. See BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, supra note 94, at 169 (“The necessity
of choosing between absolute claims is then an inescapable characteristic of the
human condition.”).

